The Future on Shaking Pillars : Civil Society and Green Economy in the United Nations Rio+20 Summit by Lehtimäki, Tomi Henrik
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The?Future?on?Shaking?Pillars?
Civil?Society?and?Green?Economy?in?the?United?Nations?Rio+20?Summit?
 
 
 
 
 
Tomi Henrik Lehtimäki 
 
University of Helsinki 
Faculty of Social Science 
Sociology 
Master’s Thesis 
January 2013 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – 
Faculty 
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Laitos – Institution – Department 
Department of Social Research 
Tekijä ?– Författare  – Author 
 Tomi Henrik Lehtimäki 
Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title 
 The Future on Shaking Pillars. Civil Society and Green Economy in the United Nations Rio+20 Summit 
Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject 
Sociology 
Työn laji – Arbetets art – 
Level 
 Master’s thesis 
Aika – Datum – Month and 
year 
14th January 2013 
Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages 
100 pp. + appendices 4 pp. 
Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract 
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themed seminars were used to gain knowledge about the agendas of the NGOs as well as Finnish government officials, 
as well as the progression of the preparations. The theoretical framework is Laurent Thévenot´s sociology of engage-
ments which focuses on disputes and the construction of commonality. The theory, combined with means of content 
analysis, is used to answer the above-mentioned research questions. 
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environmental limits and development. The NGOs constructed their agenda on the dual basis of both ecological limits 
and a human right-based approach to global inequality, which was then used to criticize economic growth. Analysis of 
the outcomes of the summit suggests a rejection of these claims. The results support a strong agenda geared towards 
poverty eradication, development and growth in the global south. The issue of green economy was tied to them. 
 
The findings of this study therefore present both continuations of old disputes as well as new developments. Debates in 
the summit preparations were locked in familiar settings, most clearly in the north-south divide, but the outcomes of 
the summit on the other hand suggest changes in the status of different actors situated in this division. The study con-
cludes that for the actors engaged in sustainable development, and more specifically on global environmental prob-
lems, need to reconsider their agendas in accordance to this new constellation of actors, which emphasize the role of 
the developing countries. 
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Tämä pro gradu –tutkielma tarkastelee suomalaisten kansalaisyhteiskunnan toimijoiden osallistumista Yhdistyneiden Kan-
sakuntien kestävän kehityksen kokoukseen, yleisemmin Rio+20, joka järjestettiin Rio de Janeirossa kesällä 2012. Kokous 
käsitteli yhtenä teemanaan vihreää taloutta köyhyyden poistamisen ja kestävän kehityksen politiikkakehikossa. Tämä tutki-
mus sijoittuu keskusteluun ympäristön rajoista ja luonnon kantokyvystä sekä niiden suhteesta kehitykseen ja taloudelliseen 
kasvuun. Nämä niin sanotut kestävän kehityksen ”pilarit” ovat olleet keskeisiä niin kansalaisjärjestöjen kuin YK:n toimin-
nassa 1970-luvulta lähtien. Näihin lähtökohtiin perustuen, tässä tutkimuksessa kysytään (1) keitä olivat kokouksen valmiste-
luprosessiin osallistuneet toimijat, (2) millaisia agendoja nämä toimijat ajoivat ja (3) millaisia olivat kokouksen lopputule-
mat kahden edellisen valossa. 
 
Tutkimuksessa käytettiin neljää aineistokokonaisuutta. Ensiksi, käytössä on Ympäristö ja kehitys –työryhmän pöytäkirjat 
alkaen vuoden  2011 alusta vuoden 2012 syyskuuhun asti. Ryhmä oli keskeinen järjestöjen yhteistyössä ja sen pöytäkirjoja 
käytetään suomalaisten kansalaisjärjestöjen ryhmän rakentumisen tarkastelussa. Toiseksi, Kansainvälisen Kestävän kehityk-
sen Instituutin (IISD) julkaisemia Earth Negotiation Bulletin –raportteja, jotka ovat päivittäinen katsaus virallisiin neuvotte-
luihin, käytetään tietolähteenä virallisista valtioiden välisistä neuvotteluista. Kolmanneksi, aineistona on viisi puolistruktu-
roitua haastattelua, joissa haastatellaan keskeisiä suomalaisia kansalaisjärjestötoimijoita, jotka osallistuivat kokouksen val-
misteluihin. Lopuksi, muistiinpanoja ja nauhoituksia kuudesta Rio+20-teemaisesta seminaarista käytettiin materiaalina, 
joiden kautta tarkasteltiin kansalaisjärjestöjen sekä Suomen virallisten edustajien näkemyksiä kokouksen teemoista sekä 
kokouksen järjestelyjen edistymistä. Teoreettisena viitekehyksenä tutkimuksessa käytettiin Laurent Thévenot´n sitoumusten 
sosiologiaan (sociology of engagements), joka keskittyy kiistoihin ja yhteisyyden rakentamiseen. Kyseisen teorian avulla, 
joka yhdistettiin analyysissa sisällönanalyysiin, käytettiin yllä mainittuihin kysymyksiin vastaamisessa. 
 
Valmisteluprosessi mobilisoi joukon keskeisiä toimijoita suomalaisista kansalaisjärjestöistä, joiden toiminnan kohteena ovat 
sekä kehitys- että ympäristökysymykset. Keskustelu vihreästä taloudesta sekä agendat, joita suomalaiset kansalaisjärjestöt 
pyrkivät edistämään, kytkeytyivät keskusteluun globaalin pohjoisen ja globaalin etelän eroista, sekä ympäristön rajojen ja 
kehityksen vastakkaisasetteluun. Kansalaisjärjestöt rakensivat kantansa sekä ympäristön rajojen että oikeusperustaisen lä-
hestymistavan varaan ja kritisoivat taloudellista kasvua tältä pohjalta. Kokouksen lopputulosten analyysi osoitti näiden 
kantojen tulleen kattavasti torjutuiksi. Tulokset tukevat vahvaa agendaa köyhyyden poistamisen, kehityksen ja kasvun puo-
lesta etelässä. Keskustelu vihreästä taloudesta sidottiin näihin päätöksiin. 
 
Tämän tutkimuksen tulokset viittaavat näin ollen samalla sekä vanhojen kiistojen jatkumiseen että uusiin kehityskulkuihin. 
Valmisteluprosessin aikaiset väittelyt sijoittuivat tuttuihin asemiin pohjoisen ja etelän välillä, mutta kokouksen lopputulok-
set viittaavat muuttuneisiin suhteisiin eri toimijoiden välillä. Tämän perusteella tutkimuksessa todetaan, että kestävän kehi-
tyksen piirissä toimivien on mietittävä toimintatapojaan uusiksi ja otettava erityisesti huomioon kehitysmaiden kasvanut 
rooli. 
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??Introduction:?the?who??the?what?and?the?how?of?civil?so-
ciety?participation?in?Rio+20??
This master’s thesis study examines (1) who were the Finnish civil society actors that 
took part in the preparatory process for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, (2) what were the agendas they promoted in the process and (3) how did 
the participants succeed in their efforts. The conference, commonly referred to as 
Rio+20, was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 20-22nd 2012, and it was a continuation to 
earlier United Nations (UN1) conferences on sustainable development, first held in Rio 
in 1992 and ten years after that in Johannesburg in 2002. 
The summit procedures followed the principles set in the original Rio summit of 1992, 
the action plan Agenda 21, establishing the nine major groups (stakeholder groups) that 
would provide for the active participation of all sectors of society. The Rio+20 website 
(UNSCD 2012) declares that “from the very beginning of the first Earth Summit in 
1992, people realized that sustainable development could not be achieved by govern-
ments alone”, and instead, according to the UN, it requires the active participation of all 
sectors of society. Rio+20 was described as “an historic opportunity to define pathways 
to a safer, more equitable, cleaner, greener and more prosperous world for all”. The two 
general themes of the conference were: green economy in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication; and the institutional framework for sustainable 
development. 
In this study the engagement of civil society into the conference is examined from the 
viewpoint of Finnish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who took part in the pre-
paratory process in Finland during 2011 and 2012. Through the discussions that re-
volved around green economy I examine aspects of agenda-building, central disputes as 
well as the role of environmental scientific knowledge on current political problems. 
                                               
1 For a full list of abbreviations used in this study, see appendix 1 
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The UN has an almost universal membership status, is concerned with a wide range of 
policy issues and is in a way accountable to the whole world (Martens 2011, 43–44). 
Even when considering the long mutual history of global governing organizations and 
NGOs, established organizations like the UN still face accusations questioning their 
legitimacy in political decision-making (McKeon 2009, 2). As Nanz and Steffek (2004, 
317) put it, established “international governance is remote from citizens, its procedures 
are opaque, and it is dominated by diplomats, bureaucrats and functional specialists”. 
As a cure for this, civil society actors are said to provide the system with more account-
ability if they can form deliberative processes around the issues. 
Despite over twenty years of use in both academic discourses as well as in policy doc-
uments, the concept of sustainable development – on which the whole summit is found-
ed on – remains a contested one. Regardless of the fact that there seems to be wide 
agreement on current ways of life being unsustainable and that sustainability is needed, 
people seem to be unable to agree what sustainability exactly means (Harding 2006). 
This applies also to green economy, as, according to David Le Blanc (2011, 151), 
“[T]he usefulness and appropriateness of green economy as a paradigm for furthering 
sustainable development are currently debated … [and] Opinions expressed tend to re-
flect strongly differing world views.” Most agree that the current production and con-
sumption patterns do not take into account, for example, environmental degradation, 
especially on the global scale. But, again, the solutions seem to be less clear. 
As I will show throughout this study, green economy is much more than accounting for 
the proper price tags of natural resources. It is at the same time seen by different actors 
as promising something new, being an unclear and useless concept and a scheme set by 
one group against the other. These points make it a good subject of analysis, as it opens 
up space for different actors (Alapuro 2001) and brings out different conceptions on 
where we should be heading. The green economy discussion was firmly connected to 
the discussion about the “three pillars” of sustainable development, the environmental, 
the social and the economic. 
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Therefore, my research questions are the following. First, who were the Finnish civil 
society actors that took part in the preparatory process and in the summit itself? In this 
will examine the political network that gathered around the preparatory process of the 
summit in Finland. The operation of this network will be examined from the viewpoint 
of  civil  society,  locating  it  to  various  scenes  in  which  members  of  Finnish  NGOs  en-
gaged with each other. Second, what were the agendas that these actors and groups 
promoted during the preparatory process? This question will focus on the political dis-
putes circulating around the concept of green economy and the political agendas con-
structed for achieving sustainable development. Both of these questions will be contex-
tualized in the historical developments that have shaped the arenas for civil society par-
ticipation  as  well  as  the  discussions  that  form  the  context  for  their  political  agendas.  
Third, how did it all turn out? I will look at the results of the summit, and continue from 
the previous two questions that function as explanatory factors. 
I will use Laurent Thévenot’s (2007; 2011a; 2011b) sociology of engagements as the 
theoretical framework of this study. Theory conceptualizes actions as engagements and 
can be used to analyse political disputes as well as actions that fall below the imperative 
of justification. This is relevant when examining situations with multiple conceptions 
about what is just as well as operations that can be understood as direct interest politics. 
The  thesis  begins  with  a  review  of  the  history  of  global  environmental  politics  in  the  
UN context. Chapter 2 addresses ways in which the global environment has been per-
ceived and shaped by previous UN summits and connects this with the role international 
NGOs have played in the events. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework and 
methods of this study as well as the materials used. Moving to the analysis section and 
the events that took place in Finland during the preparations, chapter 4 focuses on the 
actors who participated in the summit preparations, focusing on the question who partic-
ipated. Chapter 5 deals with one of the main themes of the actual summit, green econo-
my, and it will take a detailed look on what was being promoted by different groups and 
actors. In chapter 6 the outcomes and events of the summit will be discussed in asking 
how did it turned out. Chapter 7 concludes the findings of this study and discusses their 
relevance. 
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??Non-governmental?organizations?and?environmental?
politics?in?UN?history?
In this chapter I will focus on the historical developments through which current envi-
ronmental questions and the place of non-governmental organizations tightly related to 
them got their present form. Many topics dealt with in current global summits have been 
formulated or brought to public awareness partially through previous UN summits 
(Schechter 2005; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Both the position of the NGOs as well as the 
problems relating to environmental and developmental debates in the UN context have a 
long history relating to international politics and summits that have been organized in 
many  cases  on  an  ad hoc basis, generating the prevailing setting. They can be under-
stood thoroughly only by looking at the events that gave them form. 
I will show that answers to the first two research questions stated in the introduction – 
who participated and what kind of agendas did they promote – depend on the historical 
developments that have institutionalized the conditions for their contemporary unfold-
ing. The question of who participates is situated in the events that have given civil so-
ciety actors the official status they now occupy in the United Nations system. The sec-
ond question, what agendas did they promote, is also very much shaped by the discus-
sions that have developed in and around the UN system. Of particular importance to 
both questions is the 1992 United Nations Conference on Human Environment and De-
velopment  (UNCED),  known as  the  Earth  summit,  which  was  held  in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  
The historical developments which established both the place of civil society as partici-
pants and the discussions on global environmental problems were culminated in the 
Earth summit. 
This chapter covers a long time span and to manage this I will focus on certain events in 
these  developments  that  were  crucial  in  the  history  of  both  the  conceptions  about  the  
state of the environmental as well as the place of NGOs in relation to them. This review 
will show, first, that the conception about a global environment is a result of both scien-
tific  and  political  developments  connected  to  the  UN summits;  second,  these  develop-
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ments are connected to the actions of NGOs who have gradually gained their position in 
international politics. 
2.1?The?emergence?of?global?environmental?governance?and?inter-
national?NGOs?
Nongovernmental organizations have existed as long as there have been governments 
(Charnovitz 1996, 190) – and one could add that before this they were just organizations 
of one sort or the other. The concept NGO is, as Norbert Götz (2008, 234) points out, in 
the end a residual category. Their existence on the international political arenas has not 
always been self-evident nor has it been considered the same in different times. Many 
authors emphasize that the current role NGOs perform today and positions they occupy, 
especially in the UN context, are a result of a complicated and nonlinear development 
that was not set out from the start (see for example Götz 2008; also Charnovitz 1996; 
Martens 2002). 
Global and international issues are dealt with in a context that is lacking a global or in-
ternational government (Weiss & Thakur 2010; Haas 2002) and nation-states as sover-
eign actors are thought to be the bedrock of international political activity. At the same 
time, a growing number of issues are thought to be global in their nature and requiring 
universal participation – from the point of view of both legitimacy and effectiveness. 
International organizations are far from governments, but they do work as arenas for 
cooperation and provide rigidity, stability as well as, in the end, the possibility to deal 
with  global  issues.  One  of  the  most  notable  of  these  is  of  course  the  United  Nations.  
(Weiss & Thakur 2010, 1–4.) My focus in this study is not on UN decision making 
structures and procedures as such but in examining the UN as an arena where issues are 
being formed and discussed. And even though international politics is officially domi-
nated by nation states,  NGOs and civil  society actors have also had a crucial  effect  on 
the development of environmental issues on the global scale. 
Meyer et al. (1997) trace the emergence of the world environmental regime, starting 
from as  early  as  the  1870s  and  conclude  that  the  gradual  emergence  of  this  regime is  
closely connected to two long term processes involving NGOs as key actors: first, “the 
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long-term expansion of rationalized and authoritative scientific interpretation, which 
structures perceptions of common environmental problems” and, second, the rise of 
arenas  for  associational  action  and  cooperation  in  the  global  level  (p.  624).  The  most  
important of these arenas was the United Nations system which was broad enough to 
encompass also global environmental problems. 
Long-term environmental degradation was essential to the developments in environ-
mental protection, but they were not possible without working in concert with both a 
(natural) scientific understanding of nature and of NGO activity in the global scale. The 
first of these allowed people to develop an ecosystemic view that conceptualizes nature 
as an interdependent system encompassing also human beings and which “sustains the 
very possibility of life” and which is very rarely conterminous with national borders 
(Meyer et al. 1997, 630–631; Keck & Sikkink 1998, 122–123). This view is represented 
for example by the idea of “spaceship earth economics”, coined by Kenneth Boulding in 
1966, which presents humankind’s possibilities with natural resources not as unlimited 
but as confined to the limits of a single planet (Massa 2009, 14-15).  The second part, 
international nongovernmental action, provided the organizational forms for dealing 
with these issues, making it possible to form them into political agendas (Jasanoff 2004, 
45). 
NGOs had engaged in environmental issues long before the formation of the United 
Nations and its environmental program (UNEP, that was established in 1972). Since the 
latter half of the 19th century NGOs had engaged in humanitarian issues relating to war 
(The Red Cross), intellectual property, women’s and worker’s rights – to name a few 
(Charnovitz 1996, 200–205; Keck & Sikkink 1998, 39–78). NGOs also engaged in the 
preservation of nature, the first international meeting being (most likely) the Congress 
of  the  Society  of  for  the  Protection  of  Animals  held  in  1860.  In  the  cases  of  pre-UN  
conferences, it is worth noting that on multiple occasions governments also appointed 
scientists as parts of their delegations (p. 206), pointing to relations between govern-
mental  actions  and  civil  society  actors  from  early  on.  But  these  were  still  attempts  to  
deal with specific issues of protecting nature. The period up to the First World War is 
defined by Charnovitz as the time of emergence for international NGOs (p. 212). The 
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interwar period in Finland saw the emergence of the Finnish nature conservation associ-
ation (Suomen Luonnonsuojeluyhdistys) in 1938.  
In the next phase of international NGO activity, following Charnovitz's typification, 
some of the major NGOs established connections with governmental organizations, 
most  notably  the  League  of  Nations.  Many organizations  had  participated  in  the  Paris  
Peace Conference which established the League of Nations (Charnovitz 1996, 213). In 
addition to this, the League assisted several NGOs and in some parts remained open to 
them. This inclusive approach was in some notions referred to as the “League method” 
(p. 224), which provided NGOs with the possibility of participation. Different associa-
tions and organizations helped to form issues to be handled by governmental organiza-
tions  and  also  worked  as  part  of  the  organization  as  representatives  and  specialists  or  
experts (p. 245). But in the end, the League of Nations did little to promote nature pro-
tection (Charnovitz 1996. 235-236; Meyer 1997, 631). 
The UN system, even if it was weak in terms of sovereign authority, managed to change 
this by establishing a broad agenda that included environmental issues, accompanied by 
the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that included a 
focus on scientized problems and a mixture of governmental as well as NGO repre-
sentatives (Meyer et al. 1997, 631–632; Charnovitz 1996, 256). This is of course a sim-
plification of the course of events, as NGOs had focused on similar agendas much earli-
er, for example the International Statistical Congresses already convening from 1853 
(Charnovitz 1996, 198). The period, starting from the late 1930s and leading up to 1971, 
was the period when NGO participation was formalized in international governance but 
also a time that is characterized as by “underachievement” in NGO performance as 
emerging issues were handled by the rigid organizational structure that discouraged new 
movements (Charnovitz 1996, 261–262). 
Decolonization and the introduction of the North-South dynamics opened up a new di-
mension in the UN system by bringing in the question of development and its relation to 
other global agendas (McKeon 2009, 9; Keck & Sikkink 1998, 123). From the 1970s 
onwards environmental NGOs and their involvement in international governance started 
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to intensify, as the field of NGOs grew bigger in “number, size, and diversity” (Char-
novitz 1996, 261) and new ways of perceiving the environment began to emerge (Meyer 
et al. 1997; Frank et al. 2000). 
The turn of the decade saw the emergence of major environmental organizations, such 
as Friends of the Earth (founded in 1969) and Greenpeace (founded in 1971), that start-
ed operating on an international scale (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 129). This was also the 
time national ministries dedicated to environmental issues started to emerge, pointing to 
a “top-down” model particularly in the opposition of international governance versus 
nation-states schema (Meyer et al. 1997, 625, 645; Schechter 2005, 37). 
2.2?Global?conferences,?global?environments:?international?envi-
ronmental?politics?and?the?UN?from?the?1970s?onwards?
This section focuses on the two major UN summits on environment and development, 
the first held in Stockholm in 1972, and the second in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. These two 
form the historical background for Rio+20 and were central in establishing the institu-
tional settings as well as the conceptual models and discourses that operate in the con-
temporary context. Next, I will focus on the developments that have taken place in the 
UN context, starting from the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972. 
The Stockholm summit of 1972 and limits of the Earth 
As biologist David S. Woodruff (2012, 16) has stated, “any discussion of Rio+20 must 
begin with the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stock-
holm, the first global governmental discussion of the environment and development.” 
The Stockholm summit has been considered to be a milestone in both conference di-
plomacy and in raising awareness on environmental issues, such as degradation, as prior 
to the 1960s ”little international attention had been paid to the challenges of the global 
environment” (Schechter 2005, 27, emphasis added). Peter M. Haas (2002) also states 
that the global UN conferences on environment are widely regarded as an institutional 
innovation of the 1970s. The awareness and increasing politicization of global interde-
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pendence at the time was highlighted in the conferences and they aimed to gain new 
perspectives on environmental issues by putting focus on the interconnections of multi-
ple different issues, previously treated in isolation. (Haas 2002, 78.) 
The unprecedented participation of NGOs in the global environmental policy-making 
process contributed to, first, the raising of new public and political attention to these 
issues and, second, to encourage the participation of non-governmental actors in form-
ing public policy. This is to say that the conference procedures, and the preparations for 
them, helped to legitimize the role of NGOs and to ”energize environmental networks” 
(Schechter 2005, 38). This was also considered as one element that contributed to the 
success of the conference as a whole (pp. 38-39). 
Before the conference numerous publications had come out which underlined the im-
pact human actions had had on the environment. Rachel Carson's (1962) book Silent 
Spring, pointed to the hazards of polluting chemicals (for example DDT) on the envi-
ronment and raised the consciousness of the public (Jasanoff 2004, 31). The most fa-
mous account is probably the report Limits to Growth by  the  so-called  Club  of  Rome 
(Meadows et al. 1972), published in 1972, and which provided part of the context for 
the Stockholm conference, and reflected the discussion on environmental problems of 
the time. 
The Club of Rome, a vast team of researchers representing multiple disciplines, set out 
to examine the complexity of problems relating to exponentially growing consumption 
and population, and their consequences for mankind. These were examined with their 
then-state-of -the-art computer model, which was constructed with interconnected vari-
ables that reflected global growth trends. The five major trends examined were: acceler-
ating industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of 
nonrenewable resources, and a deteriorating environment. They perceived the various 
problems of the time as inherently global and common to all, as they were occurring to 
some degree in all societies. These were problems that brought together technical, social, 
economic, and political elements. And, most importantly, formed an interconnected 
whole. (Meadows et al. 1972, 11–24.) 
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These calls for action provided new ways to perceive environmental problems, connect-
ing them to human activity, and binding them to larger developmental and economic 
issues (Schechter 2005, 28-29; Long Martello & Jasanoff 2004, 6). Many publications 
presented new ways to perceive the place of humanity in relation to nature but the re-
conceptualization happened through a certain kind of erasure: the elimination of people, 
human made borders and cultural boundaries – leading to the establishment of a global-
ly understood environment. One of these issues was “acid rain”, seen as a transboundary 
phenomenon and requiring international cooperation (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 123). Most 
iconic  of  these  global  depictions  was  the  picture  of  the  Earth  taken  from space  which  
posited it famously as the fragile “pale blue dot”, changing the humanized gaze into an 
ecological one (McManus 1996, 49; Jasanoff 2004, 37). 
As the Limits to Growth-report can be seen as an example in the process of establishing 
a  picture  of  a  global,  common  environment,  it  is  also  connected  to  the  current  global  
trends by trying to present a new time frame of perceiving these problems. The authors 
state that “only a few people have a global perspective that extends far into the future” 
(Meadows et al. 1972, 19; emphasis added) and that their model sought to understand 
the development “as much as one hundred years to the future” (p. 21). This connected 
the discussion on global environmental trends to a context that put forward a long-term 
time perspective, essential to later conceptions of sustainable development. 
Also, new innovations concerning NGOs and civil society actors were made already 
before the actual conference in 1971 when a group of experts was commissioned to pro-
vide information for a background report and advice for further practices. The only re-
straint set for the group was – interestingly – not to prejudge the work of governments 
and only to provide information. (Schechter 2005, 30.) 
North–South -relations were in most cases divided by issues relating to views about the 
connection between development and the environment. Developing countries from the 
South perceived many environmental measures as attempts by the North to restrict their 
possibilities for development. This is not to say that many developed countries were not 
skeptical about environmental restrictions that might interfere with economic growth. 
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The United States were against notions that tried to form linkages between environmen-
tal protection and development (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 124). 
Prior to the conference, a panel of experts was commissioned to clarify the relationship 
between these issues, in order to establish wider interest towards the conference. The 
Founex commission, established by the Secretary-General of both the Stockholm and 
the original 1992 Rio de Janeiro summit, Maurice Strong, conceptualized environmental 
issues as inseparable from developmental issues, stating that the environment does not 
include only the biophysical sphere but also societal structures. Environmental damage 
was then seen as a result from the same forces that produced poverty, underdevelopment 
etc. (Schechter 2005, 31–33; Haas 2002, 80.) The themes later attached to sustainable 
development – the oppositional relation between the environment and global develop-
ment – were already present in the commission’s report (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 123–
124). 
Regarding the institutional settings the Stockholm conference resulted in the establish-
ment of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), as already mentioned 
above. According to Schechter, there is evidence that scientists and NGOs were among 
the strongest proponents for a new more powerful institution, but this was against na-
tional interests, and led to an organization with a lower mandate. Even still, the “un-
precedented participation of NGOs in the global environmental policy-making process” 
was seen as one of the achievements of the conference, and UNEP was seen as forum 
for NGO participation. (Schechter 2005, 36–38.) 
The Earth Summit of 1992 and sustainable development 
Held  20  years  after  the  Stockholm  conference,  the  UNCED  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  is  also  
considered to be a landmark in global environmental politics. Although the summit is 
seen as the central event that established new conventions and practices, it can also be 
seen  as  a  culminating  point  for  previous  developments,  as  was  the  case  with  the  UN-
CHE. One factor that contributed the establishment of the UNCED was the UN General 
Assembly’s ten-year review report of the Stockholm conference, which showed that 
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little progress had been made. Historically the summit was organized at a time charac-
terized by the optimism brought about by the ending of the Cold War. Even though this 
marked a turning point in some developments, the UNCED was a continuation to previ-
ous developments in the UN system. (Schechter 2005, 115–118.) 
The Rio summit of 1992 built on the Stockholm summit in many ways. It recast the 
Stockholm declaration in new language of sustainable development, and put forward the 
Agenda 21 which was planned to be the blueprint for implementing sustainable devel-
opment. As Stockholm had focused on “first-generation” problems (e.g. water, air and 
land degradation) Rio put forward a new set of “second-generation” issues, producing 
conventions on for example climate change and biodiversity; the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (with 287 principles for guiding action); and the Agenda 
21,  an  action-plan  to  promote  sustainable  development.  The  Rio  convention  was  also  
significantly bigger than its predecessors. More than 1,100 NGOs were accredited, 
compared to the 134 in Stockholm. NGOs and other civil society actors also staged an 
alternative Global Forum parallel to the summit, but in the end there was not much di-
rect interaction between the two. (Schechter 2005, 115–116; Seyfang & Jordan 2002.) 
Despite the interest on environmental problems in the beginning of the 1970s, manifest-
ed in the 1972 summit, momentum had been lost on the international level and imple-
mentation had been weak. The UN General Assembly had agreed to set up an independ-
ent commission in 1983, under the leadership of Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland. The publication that resulted from the commission is the report titled Our 
Common Future (WCED 1987), more commonly known as the Brundtland-report. It 
provided a definition for sustainable development in which environment and develop-
ment were connected in the same manner the Founex commission and the Club of 
Rome had already done. (Schechter 2005, 39, 117.) This has been the case in the post-
Brundtland discussion on sustainable development, which has continued for more than 
20 years now. According to the Brundtland report, sustainable development was “to 
ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 8). 
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In the Commission’s view, the concept of sustainable development does imply limits in 
the range of current resources and abilities, but social organization and technology can 
set  forth  a  new age  of  economic  growth.  Poverty  eradication  and  a  fair  distribution  of  
natural resources to all was a primary precondition for the Commission, and without it 
environmental catastrophes could not be avoided. (WCED, 8–9.) Even though the term 
sustainability had been used already before the commission’s report, and the core ideas 
implemented in it had been put in place already in 1972 at Stockholm, what Brundtland 
managed to do was to bind together the interests of the global south (economic devel-
opment, poverty eradication) and north (economic development, conservation of nature). 
(Harding 2006, 231–232.)  
As Jasanoff puts it “the commission offered at one level a newly thought out message 
about the obligations of environmental ethics, but its message could also be read as 
deeply political” (Jasanoff 2004, 37). It advocated a new formulation of the global view 
in which the shared responsibility transcended the old nationalism of states. The Brund-
tland Commission popularized the idea of sustainable development and gave it political 
authority, which could then be adopted to official talks in the Earth Summit. But at the 
same time the report marginalized other discourses of sustainability that did not fit into 
the new definition. The Commissions definition put emphasis on development, and 
managed to bring together different aspirations focusing on “achieving full growth po-
tential” with a reference on protecting the environment. The emphasis on development 
was in many ways interpreted as implying growth, leaving out the possibility to under-
stand sustainability as for example de-growth. (McManus 1996, 48–55; Harding 2006, 
232.) This might be said to be inherent to these legitimized discussions, reaching back 
to already the Limits to Growth –report (Levallois 2010). 
Agenda 21 established the nine stakeholder groups or major groups (women, children 
and youth, indigenous peoples, NGOs, local authorities, workers and trade unions, busi-
ness and industry, scientific and technological communities, and farmers) and at the 
same time widened the scope of civil society participation. This gave new possibilities 
to  NGOs  as  from  the  Earth  summit  onwards  contributions  from  civil  society  did  not  
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operate through unofficial side-events but from official contributions. (Seyfang 2003, 
227.) 
2.3?Formalized?NGO?participation?and?the?North–South-divide?
If the world political situation of the original Rio summit was characterized by the op-
timism created by the end of the Cold War, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable De-
velopment (WSSD), held in Johannesburg, was characterized by the fact that “the USA 
had become the global hegemon” (Schechter 2005, 154). It was one of the most antici-
pated of the UN global conferences, and this might have also been its biggest problem. 
The WSSD went “well beyond the environmental focus of the previous summits” in its 
agenda setting. Approximately 22,000 people participated in the summit, of which 
8,000 where representatives of different major groups (p. 188). 
According to Schechter, too high expectations, combined with the fact that the post-
Rio1992 implementation was considered to have been rather weak, set the tone for the 
summit outcomes, which in the end were also considered to have been rather weak (pp. 
187-194). The Johannesburg summit also set the tone for following global environmen-
tal negotiations, in which the optimism brought about by the end of the Cold War had 
faded. At the same time, the 20 years after the Earth summit have seen a clear change in 
the situation of the developing countries, most notably in Latin America, which has 
been said to have moved towards sustainability in environmental issues but is still fac-
ing problems in social equality (Onestini 2012). 
As a general trend, nongovernmental organizations have participated at UN decision-
making at a growing rate since the latter half of the 20th century. The number of accred-
ited organizations has grown tremendously since the formation of the organization. Still, 
they have not been able to contribute in furthering transparency and their role in making 
the UN more accountable has been on the side of providing consultation (Martens 2011, 
51–53). NGOs gained more political space in the end of the century but still “awareness 
of the need to re-examine the architecture of world governance mounted rapidly during 
the early 1990s” (McKeon 2009, 6). NGOs have participated in global governance for a 
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long time – but most of the time they have been well-established Western organizations 
with headquarters in North America or Europe, as was already noted earlier. 
The concept of sustainable development is in many ways perceived to be set from a top-
down viewpoint. As I have pointed out above, it was coined and gradually formulated in 
international summits, and the failure has been seen to have happened on the level of 
local implementation. This emphasis on the all-encompassing nature of the problem is 
of course reasonable – but at the same time this has prevented “sustainability” to gain 
local manifestations and actions as local politicians and citizen have been unable to see 
their role in the scheme. According to Per Mickwitz (2012, 76–78), the two key features 
of sustainability are “comprehensiveness and an intergenerational perspective” and 
these also have made the issue more of an elite project of researchers and experts, dis-
tant from politicians and citizens (i.e. voters). 
Altogether then, sustainable development in the UN’s context works with multiple his-
torical factors that have produced its advantages but also its most complicated problems. 
The position of having no direct mandate from “the people” creates a demand for civil 
society participation working through different civil society associations. The problem 
is unfortunately not only limited to having inadequate legitimacy towards civil society 
alone, but also between countries from the global North and the global South. The divi-
sion was established already in the 1972 Stockholm conference and has continued to 
shape the questions on environment and development. Most clearly the division be-
tween countries is highlighted in the problem of defining sustainable development: what 
is the relationship between environmental protection, societal development and econom-
ic growth? 
Coming back to the who- and what-questions, a more detailed answer can now be given. 
In regards to the first one (the “who” part), the place of civil society has been expanded 
gradually in the UN system, giving it an established position, most notably through the 
establishment of the stakeholder groups. Civil society is seen to provide the system with 
accountability but also to be a part of creating and implementing solutions. Since the 
1970s civil society actors have operated in a situation characterized by the division be-
16 
 
 
 
tween the developing and industrialized countries. This division shapes the most press-
ing political issues faced by the system (the “what” part). Countries are increasingly 
seen as operating in a global environment, characterized by issues like climate change 
that transcends national boundaries. But environmental problems are only part of the 
puzzle, as since the first Rio conference (UNCED) they are connected to issues of de-
velopment, through the concept of sustainable development. 
??Analytical?framework,?materials?and?methods?
The review on the historical developments of global environmental politics has pointed 
out the diverging conceptions different groups have on issues of development, growth 
and the global environment, some relating to narrower interest politics and others in 
attempts to conceptualize them in broader terms. I have also emphasized the fact that 
the way the environment and the problems relating to it are perceived naturally shapes 
the agendas of environmental politics. As Jasanoff (2004, 45) has emphasized “produc-
ing facts on a planetary scale requires not only scientific instruments and work, but also 
institutions capable of interpreting and disseminating knowledge.” The same can of 
course be noted on international political agendas in general, as they also operate be-
tween local actions and global governance, forming connections between particular 
events and universal agendas. These notions point us to look at interconnected processes 
of knowledge-production and political justification and the allocation of responsibility. 
This also sets the scene for actors engaging in environmental politics and developmental 
issues in the context of UN global summits. The discourses and conceptual frameworks 
that shape the perception of the environment and the institutional settings shaped 
through the history of UN politics form the setting and the limits in which both civil 
society actors, governmental representatives and UN officials operate. But as was 
shown, these are not set in stone – rather they are a result of power struggles and 
knowledge  accumulation  that  have  a  history  of  their  own.  The  brief  historical  review  
has shown the enmeshing of ecological limits (Meadows et al. 1972) to the role of NGO 
activity (Meyer et al. 1997) and to the understanding of current global political issues on 
both development and ecology (WCED 1987; Harding 2006). 
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Next, building on these notions, I will pose a theoretical framework that attempts to 
grasp the ways actors engage in these environmental political arenas, using and shaping 
the material, moral and political furniture. I will focus on presenting it as means of deal-
ing with both the knowledge production processes as well as political disputes related to 
various conceptions of justified actions. The theoretical framework in chapter 3.1 will 
serve  as  the  analytical  apparatus  of  this  study.  After  this  I  will  present  the  process  
through which the data sets used in this study were gathered and describe them as well 
as their analysis in detail. 
3.1?The?sociology?of?engagements?
Laurent Thévenot’s (2002; 2007; 2011a; 2011b) moral and political sociology builds on 
the idea of different regimes of engagement. These different regimes of engagement 
present action in plural forms (“action conceived as plural”, Thévenot 2007, 411), 
which all fit into different situations and forms of common social life. They are ways by 
which human beings construct order and stability from an uncertain world – without 
emphasizing too much either the collectives that people are a part of or their individual 
personalities or identities (Thévenot 2011a, 8–9).  Both of these viewpoints are subject 
to different regimes the actors engage with, giving them both rigidity and diversity. It is 
also a way of examining plural orders of worth and ways in which actors solve prob-
lems between these different forms. The orders of worth are conventionalized ways of 
evaluating how particular actions contribute to the establishment of the common good. 
The theory takes up Emile Durkheim’s and Marcel Mauss’ sociology of cognitive cate-
gories (Thévenot 2007; 2011b), but instead of relating them to groups that the actors 
belong to, it situates them into different action-situations that operate through different 
cognitive categories. Instead of action Thévenot  uses  the  term  engagement to put the 
focus  on  the  situations  in  which  the  human  agent  is  enmeshed  (see  also  Boltanski  &  
Thévenot 2006 [1991], 129). As Thévenot (2007, 441) puts it “the fact is that cognitive 
forms vary considerably as the human being detaches herself from what is closest and 
most personal and moves to communicate across increasing relational distances”. The 
theory thus examines the cognitive and evaluative ways actors use making equivalencies 
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between the particular and the universal. When engaging in politics on global environ-
mental problems and questions of global justice, these aspects are all the more empha-
sized. 
In addition to the situational character of engagement, the concept emphasizes, first, the 
person’s dependence on the environment she relies on, while also being able to combine 
it with a notion of certain cognitive formats the actor uses to grasp the situation (p. 415). 
Conceptualizing action as engagements Thévenot combines the notion of the agent and 
the environment in which the action takes place. Different engagement regimes include 
different cognitive formats, different operating environments (varying in e.g. abstract-
ness), and different forms of agency. Secondly, the concept of engagement also refers to 
the “quest for a guaranteed good” that forms the regime in which persons engage in; 
engaging in this second meaning refers to the common pledge that forms the regime – 
the social  bond formed between actors in a certain setting is also a moral one.  Both of 
these characteristics vary according to the different situations that actors encounter. 
The regimes of engagement employed in this study are (1) the regime of public justifi-
cation and (2) the regime of engagement in a plan. The regimes aim to establish differ-
ent  conceptions  of  a  community  and  the  good  that  it  is  founded  on.  In  the  regime  of  
public justification the evaluation of deeds or arrangements is judged by their contribu-
tion  to  the  common  good  according  to  different  orders  of  worth  (see  Table  1).  In  the  
regime of plan evaluation is based on the satisfaction gained from accomplishing action, 
without further consideration of other contributions the completed action might have. 
These conceptions of good and forms of community are in connection to the social 
bonds shared in each regime. (Thévenot 2007; 2011a.) 
The construction of commonality works through what Thévenot calls grammars of 
commonality,  each  relating  to  a  certain  regime  of  engagement.  All  of  these  grammars  
are compatible with the notion of common humanity,  but they offer different solutions 
in the recognition of differences (Thévenot 2010). The notion of commonality itself is 
insufficient in either describing the tensions that arise from being together or the solu-
tions actors find in solving them. The grammars have two basic operations: communica-
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tion and composition. Communication refers not only to the exchanging of information 
but to a broader sense of connecting to a common locus and taking part in common mat-
ters, investing oneself in it. The second part, composition, “aims at arranging different 
voices to form a whole which can then be referred to as commonality” (p. 5), in other 
words, to the forming of solutions that binds the participants of disputes together, form-
ing a collective around issues. 
Conceptions and conventions are maintained collectively, in a Durkheimian fashion, but 
this does not imply a setting based on a single primary group or community. Instead, the 
collectives and conceptions of the common good or justice based on them are enrolled 
in action situations (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 360–363). This is already included in 
the concept of engagement as  is  the  rejection  of  the  notion  of  differing  spheres  of  the  
social and material worlds. This directs us to the dynamics in which actors align them-
selves in different situated collectives, depending on the issues at hand. 
Orders of worth and the liberal grammar 
The regime of justification brings disputes to the fore (Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 148). The 
focus is on situations where the un-reflected course of action is interrupted and the rela-
tions between the actors, engaged in the disruptive event, need to be set in place again. 
In these critical events the imperative for justification becomes necessary, if the dispute 
is not settled through violence. Boltanski and Thévenot (1999; 2006 [1991]) claim that 
there are conventionalized ways of settling disputes which can be conceptualized 
through  what  they  call  justificatory  worlds  (cité). Each of these worlds establishes an 
order of worth through which persons, actions and objects are valued. 
Worth cannot be attributed through a particular or personalized way – instead there is a 
need to make reference to more abstract principles that transcends the particular situa-
tion. The orders of worth are conventionalized ways of evaluating how particular ac-
tions contribute to the establishment of the common good. They are seen as “arguments 
which make some claim to general applicability by reference to different values, princi-
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ples or models for judging what is good, worthy and right” (Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 
2000, 236). 
Table 1 Orders of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999) 
  
Form of 
worth 
Persons Relations Actions 
Civic Collective Public communities, 
representatives 
Mobilizing, official Representing 
Domestic Personal Relatives Hierarchy, trust Recommending, 
inviting 
Industrial Efficient Experts Formal, defined Organizing, 
standardizing 
Market Wealth, 
money 
The rich, 
buyers, sellers 
Competitive Trading,  
exchanging 
Inspiration Grace Artists Independence, 
passion 
Rebelling,  
imagining 
Opinion Fame Celebrities, 
opinion leaders 
Reputation Recognizing 
Green Nature 
friendly 
Environmentalists Ecosystemic Conservation 
 
The six orders of worth originally identified by Boltanski and Thévenot are the follow-
ing: civic, domestic, industrial, market, inspiration and opinion (Boltanski & Thévenot 
1999; 2006 [1991]). In the civic world collectives are emphasized as central actors, and 
collective will, equality and legality are central sources of worth. In the domestic world 
relatives and close acquaintances are relevant actors, and hierarchy, tradition and cus-
toms are sources of worth. In the industrial world efficiency and planning is valued and 
experts and engineers are relevant actors. In the market world wealth and possessions 
are valued, and buyers and sellers, engaged in free trading, are relevant. In the world of 
inspiration worth is derived from an immediate relation to external an external source, 
and holy persons, artists and rebels are seen as relevant actors. In the world of opinion 
or renown fame and recognition are the sources of worth and celebrities and other well-
known persons are granted as worthy. 
A seventh order of worth, the green worth, has been suggested by later studies (Thé-
venot, Moody & Lafaye 2000, 256–263; Latour 2003). It includes justifications that 
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posit “green-ness” as a thing valuable for its own sake. This refers to the valuing of a 
clean and unpolluted environment, healthy and functioning ecosystems, the well-being 
of animals and environmentalism. Persons who align their actions so that they are com-
patible with healthy and functioning ecosystems or who promote leaving nature to its 
own, are considered worthy. Through the qualifications of these worlds worth is as-
cribed to persons, actions and objects. The characters of the different orders of worth are 
elaborated in the analysis section of this study. 
A dispute can take place within a single world. In this way the participants engaged 
agree on the order of worth, but disagree on how it should be formulated. In this version 
actors strive for establishing tests,  that  make it  possible to ”measure” the worth of the 
relevant entities of the situation. But the worlds can also be juxtaposed against each 
other: one world can be criticized or denounced from another world. A third way is to 
form a  compromise  between different  worlds,  in  which  solutions  that  combine  two or  
more  orders  of  worth  are  used  concurrently.  A  compromise  between  two  worlds  can  
also be used to denounce a third one. (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999; Ylä-Anttila 2010.) 
Tuomas Ylä-Anttila (2010a) has also put forward the possibilities of forming new rela-
tions between the worlds by requirement and implication. In the first case achieving one 
form of good requires the achievement of another worth. In the latter achieving one sort 
of worth also results in another worth. (Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 188.) The possibilities of 
these combinations are further elaborated in chapter 5, where the disputes relating to 
green economy and sustainable development are analyzed. 
The grammar of public justification strives for publicly justifiable solutions, based on 
some form of common worth. In contrast, in the regime of engagement in a plan con-
nected with the liberal grammar, actions fall below the requirement of public agreement 
and the capacity to accomplish one’s own plan is the main function. Even though not 
conditioned by the need for common qualifications, this latter regime supports mutual 
coordination and the achievement of a resolution. It is based on the recognition of par-
ticular interests and does not require the complete abstaining from personal interests 
(Thévenot 2011a, 12–13). Individual responsibility as well as reciprocity between these 
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responsibilities, formalized in contracts and agreements, presumes this engagement 
(Thévenot 2011b, 48–49). As the grammar of public justification can be illustrated by 
solutions that promote for example democracy or ecological thinking that benefit but 
also obligate all, the liberal grammar can be described as notions of sovereignty granted 
for nation states or as interest politics. 
3.2?Materials?and?methods?
In this section I will review and present the materials used in this study and the analysis 
scheme. In the first section, I will first describe the process through which the materials 
were gathered and after that I will present each data set individually. In the second sec-
tion I will introduce the analysis scheme. 
The data 
The data used in this study consists of document materials, semi-structured interviews 
and personal observations made in public seminars. Together they make it possible to 
trace the multifaceted preparatory process by supplementing each other by complemen-
tary and juxtaposed settings. 
The collection of the materials used in this study proceeded through several phases. In 
the spring of 2012 I first attended seminars which discussed Rio+20 and its themes. I 
also went through the materials which were handed out in them as well as other materi-
als published by Finnish NGOs. In addition to the recording and notes made in the sem-
inars, this provided me with a picture of the actors engaged in the process as well as the 
agendas they were promoting. Based on these observations, I formulated my interview 
form and contacted the NGOs to reach interviewees. Through the contact I made with 
the representatives of Kehys ry. I got hold of the document material, which documents 
the meetings of the Environment and development group. The data sets used are: 
1. the records and memos of the Environment and development group (EDG, 
Ympäristö ja kehitys –työryhmä) 
2. the “Earth Negotiations Bulletins” published by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD 2012) 
23 
 
 
 
3. five semi-structured interviews conducted with Finnish NGO representatives 
that were key figures in the Finnish preparatory process 
4. recordings and personal observations made while participating (as an audience 
member) in six public seminars dealing with the Rio+20 preparations in Finland 
(see appendix 2) 
The Environment and development group (see Kehys 2012a) is a common forum 
through which Finnish NGOs cooperate in development and environment issues. The 
group is coordinated by Kehys ry. and it was one of the central arenas for the Finnish 
NGOs that participated in the summit preparations. The first set of materials, the records 
of the EDG (from January 2011 to September 2012) consist of 15 memos, which sum-
marize the discussions and decisions of the group’s meetings. The materials, which the 
group produced, add up to approximately 100 pages of materials that deal with the 
groups preparations to the summit. These records are referred to in the text as “EDG” 
and the date of the meeting (e.g. “EDG 2.3.2011”, the meeting that took place in the 2nd 
of March 2011). The records are originally in Finnish and all quotes from them are my 
translations. 
Second, the “Earth Negotiation Bulletins” are a daily coverage on the negotiations start-
ing from the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in the 13th of June 2012 (see IISD 
2012). They are a valuable source that provides “an indispensable, chronological record 
of how the outcome document came about” (Clémençon 2012, 335). They are referred 
to as “IISD” and the number of the bulletin (e.g. “IISD 41.”, the 41st bulletin published 
by the IISD). 
The third set of materials is formed by five semi-structured interviews. The interviews 
were  made  with  key  NGO  actors  in  the  Finnish  preparatory  process.  All  of  the  inter-
views were structured by using the same question form (see appendix 3), which was 
based both on knowledge gained from theory as well as previous research and observa-
tions made in the Rio+20 themed seminars (see appendix 2). The interview lasted from 
one hour to an hour and half each. I first transcribed the recordings into text and then 
used this text to conduct the analysis. Quotations taken from the interviews are referred 
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to as for example “I1”, meaning the first interview conducted. The names of the inter-
viewees are not used so that they remain anonymous. 
The interviewees represented the following organizations: Finnish Association for Na-
ture Conservation (FANC), Kepa ry., Kehys ry., the UN association of Finland and 
Siemenpuu Foundation. Friends of the Earth Finland and Greenpeace were also ap-
proached – Friends of the Earth several times – but both declined. In the case of Green-
peace the representatives stated that the preparatory process in Finland was not that im-
portant to them, as they participated in the negotiations through their international or-
ganization. Friends of the Earth Finland stated no particular reason. 
The fourth set of data in this study comprises of recordings and personal observations I 
made in public seminars and panel discussions that dealt with the Rio+20 summit in 
Finland (for a detailed list of the seminars analyzed, see appendix 2). All of them were 
organized in relation to the preparations, as NGOs, governmental officials and other 
organizations wanted to raise awareness and discussion on the themes of the summit. 
Another function for the seminars was to engage different groups and actors with each 
other. I will use the materials I gathered while participating in these events as data as 
they provide information about the summit’s themes, different claims and agendas the 
participants were promoting and about how different representatives evaluate the views 
of other participants. 
They can be used as both objects of observation, in which interest  is  what kind of dis-
cussions were going on during the preparations; and also accounts and statements by the 
participants which express  their particular views on the subject. In the events members 
of different stakeholder groups as well as government officials both give out official 
statements about their claims and try to influence each other as well as raise awareness 
in the public. 
The events can in most cases be compared to group discussions, which can be defined 
as an interview type where a group of people is invited to discuss a certain topic in a 
focused but free-formed manner (Valtonen 2005, 223). In most cases these events (e.g. 
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panel discussions) brought together key actors and discussed issues central to this study 
– in a way forming a group discussion event that would have otherwise been impossible 
to arrange for a single researcher. These events generated data which is in some parts 
different from interview materials as it is based on the interaction between the partici-
pants (p. 228). Examples of these are for example civil society actors discussing with 
each other but also situations where NGO members engage in debates with government 
officials. 
The difference to actual group discussions and interviews is that the actors are situated 
in a public event in front of an audience with its own dynamics. But in many other parts 
the situations resemble a group discussion or group interview, which all have modera-
tors presenting questions, directing the discussion and participants making references to 
others’ statements (Valtonen 2005).  The panel discussions are a mixture of both state-
ments prepared specifically for the event and spontaneous comments given as replies. 
Theory-based content analysis 
I analyzed the materials from the point of view of group formation and agenda-building, 
which  are  both  themes  set  by  my  research  questions  described  above.  By  this  I  mean  
that I examined how the actors (individuals, representatives, NGOs etc.) align them-
selves behind certain claims and how did they see the relations between different actors 
and their claims. 
The primary method of this study is content analysis, which was guided by the theory 
apparatus and previous research on the subject (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2006, 93-119). Con-
tent  analysis  is  used  as  a  method  to  condense  the  materials  and  present  themes  under  
analysis in a generalized form. The information looked for is scattered around the mate-
rials and the attempt is to present it by organizing it into relevant categories (pp. 105–
110). This means a hermeneutic approach to material and the focus on the meaning of 
contents, instead of a quantitative approach. Recurrent themes are seen to be relevant, 
but they are not set as a primary concern. 
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The  concrete  processing  of  the  materials  were  done  with  the  qualitative  analysis  soft-
ware Atlas.TI (Friese 2012), which makes it possible attach codes and notes to the ma-
terials and conduct searches by them. Going through the materials I first put emphasis 
on parts that dealt with actors considered to be relevant (“who are the participants”) and 
the agendas that were promoted by them (“what are they promoting”). At some instanc-
es the agendas and claims were stated clearly by the actors themselves (for example in 
the case of the NGOs in their public statements and publications) and in some points 
they were identified through looking at recurrent arguments and descriptions (inter-
views and public presentations).  
Having identified central groupings and themes in the political discussions, I analyzed 
each of them in depth by for example looking at recurrent views and descriptions of 
other  groups.  This  meant  looking  at  for  example  descriptions  that  all  or  almost  all  at-
tached to some group or certain theme. Agendas, claims and arguments categorized in 
this way where then interpreted through the categories provided by the sociology of 
engagements and justification theory (Table 2) making it possible to situate different 
claims to each other and interpret their operation. The different data sets also made it 
possible to compare these categorizations, for example in the case of officially stated 
stands and arguments made in interview situations; or comparing statements made in 
face-to-face interviews and in public seminars. While analyzing the materials, attention 
was paid particularly to discussions and notions about green economy and other issues 
the actors related to it. 
Based on theoretical framework provided by Thévenot´s sociology of engagements and 
the  materials  described  above,  I  will  now turn  to  the  analysis  of  study.  The  following  
chapters address the group formation and the construction of different agendas; an anal-
ysis  of  different  agendas  and  orders  of  worth  present  in  the  actions  of  different  actors  
and groups; and finally the outcomes of summit in the context of the previous two. 
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??Who?participated?in?the?preparatory?process??The?polit-
ical?network?and?group?formation?
This chapter focuses on the actors who participated in the summit preparations in Fin-
land, their common relations and the issues dealt with and constructed during the pre-
paratory process – the focus is on the who-part of the analysis. I will analyze the field in 
which Finnish NGOs operate, their position in the official preparations organized by the 
government of Finland, and ways the NGOs themselves were active. The primary mate-
rial for the analysis conducted in this section will be the records and memos of the Envi-
ronment and development group. This material will serve to structure the analysis on 
the preparatory process, which is traced from the beginning of 2011 up to the summit. 
In addition to this, recorded interviews and published documents will be used to further 
expose specific points of focus. Based on these, I aim to identify who were the relevant 
actors in the NGO group and, on the other hand, who did they regard as relevant. Con-
nected to this I examine how these relevant actors constructed central agendas inside the 
NGO stakeholder group. This will contribute to a picture of the political network which 
gathered around the issues in the preparatory process, and will serve as the basis for 
further analysis. 
The structure of the chapter will be the following. First, I will examine arenas of partic-
ipation in which the preparations took place and in which the policy agendas were 
formed. This will include identifying key associations and their representatives, central 
places for policy formation and an overall picture of the political network that they 
formed together. Second, I will focus on the central agendas and stands and events that 
shaped the Finnish preparatory process leading to the summit. And last, I will shortly 
examine the division of labor between the associations as a way of operating in the di-
verse field of sustainable development. 
The official preparations in the UN system started already in 2010. The Preparatory 
committees (PrepComs) are responsible for overseeing the work of the conference sec-
retariat as well as expert and regional meetings. They determine the timetables, draft 
texts and organizational arrangements, which are to mobilize the support of national 
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delegations. (Schechter 2005, 10.) The first PrepCom for the UNCSD was held in May 
16-18th 2010 at the UN Headquarters. It was followed by the second PrepCom in 7-8th 
of March 2011 and regional preparatory meetings that took place in the second half of 
2011. The third and last PrepCom took place at Rio in 13-15th of June 2012. The Prep-
Coms  and  the  regional  meetings  discussed  the  conference  themes  as  well  as  saw  the  
emergence of third theme, the sustainable development goals (SDGs), which was a pro-
posal made by Colombia and Guatemala. The preparations in general were considered 
to be difficult and additional meetings to combat the problems between different coun-
tries and groups were also arranged. In the end of May 2012 most of the paragraphs 
included in the draft text for the outcome document still had un-agreed, bracketed text 
in them, also the section dealing with green economy. (IISD 41.–44.; UNCSD 2012.) 
This negotiation process structured the summit preparations on an international level, 
providing Finnish actors with deadlines, themes, information etc. In the following sec-
tions I will examine the preparations from the point of view of Finnish civil society ac-
tors. 
4.1?Arenas?and?actors?in?the?preparatory?process?in?Finland?
Based on the analyses, the preparation process structured around two central arenas, 
which were complimented by various activities and events linked to these locations of 
policy formation. The official preparatory committee organized by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs is where the national agendas were formally decided and discussed, and 
through it the NGOs had a link to the official preparations. It had a central position in 
the political network as civil society actors’ goal was to influence the crafting of the 
official agenda of Finland, and to include their own views in it. The second arena is the 
Environment and development group, coordinated by Kehys ry. (the Finnish NGDO 
Platform to the EU), which was adapted to serve as a meeting place for NGO represent-
atives and to form common agendas. Both groups consisted of government officials as 
well as NGO members: the official committee had two NGO representatives (from 
Kepa and FANC), who were also members of the Environment and development group, 
which in its part had governmental representatives in many of its meetings. 
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Three  associations  in  general  are  in  a  central  position  in  this  network  as  two of  them,  
Kepa, the Service Center for Development Coordination, and The Finnish Association 
for Nature Conservation (FANC; Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto), had representatives in 
the official preparatory committee organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
third, Kehys ry., was responsible for coordinating the Environment and development 
group, which is in the spotlight of this analysis. Naturally many associations and civil 
society  actors  in  addition  to  these  three  also  took  actively  part  in  the  negotiations  and  
preparations, for example through the Environment and development group (Table 2). 
Kehys ry. describes itself as an “ideologically, politically and religiously unaligned co-
operation and service organisation” that works to promote information about the EU’s 
developmental policy and to help Finnish NGOs in influencing it (Kehys 2012b). It is 
an umbrella organization and has as its members nearly 40 associations, including Kepa 
which  states  that  it  is  “an  active  member  of  Kehys”  (Kepa  2012a).  As  for  Kepa,  it  is  
also an umbrella organization with more than 300 developmental and environmental 
organizations, including FANC. The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation is a 
traditional association, focused on a large variety of issues relating to nature conserva-
tion and protection. It has a long history leading to its predecessor Suomen Luonnon-
suojeluyhdistys that was founded already in 1938. It is the largest membership-based 
environmental NGO in Finland (FANC 2012). The participation of the associations 
worked primarily through individual representatives, or a small group people working 
on  the  issues.  Still,  all  participants  emphasized  that  taking  part  in  the  Rio+20  process  
and its preparations were first discussed by the executive boards of the associations, 
which then legitimated representatives to work on behalf of the collective actors. 
The Environment and development group is one the theme groups Kehys coordinates in 
attempting to support their member organizations’ work towards the EU (Kehys 2012a). 
The group organized 14 meetings starting from 2011 and leading to the summit held in 
June 2012, of which all discussed issues related to the Rio+20 summit (Table 2). One 
additional  meeting  after  the  summit  is  included  in  this  study,  as  it  dealt  with  the  out-
comes of the summit. It was a place where NGO actors shared and received information 
from official preparations, as at least one of the two NGO members of official prepara-
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tory committee, as well as members of either the Environmental Ministry or the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, were also present in most of the meetings. According to the in-
terviewees it was a place where NGO statements were discussed and formal comments 
as well as common agendas were constructed. 
 
Table 2 Associations according to the number of times they had a representative in the Environ-
ment and development group's meetings and their primary field of interest. Associations with par-
ticipants present in only one meeting are not included (these include e.g. Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the Family Federation of Finland) (of 15 meetings in total) 
Organization Field Participation 
Kehys ry. Development 15 
Finn Church Aid Development 13 
FANC Environment 11 
UN Union Development 11 
Dodo ry. Environment 9 
Kepa Development 8 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government 8 
Siemenpuu Foundation Development/Environment 7 
WWF Environment 5 
Save the children Development 3 
Ministry of Environment Government 2 
Attac Development 2 
Asia-Europe People's Forum Development 2 
Living together in cities Religion 2 
 
As already stated, the official preparatory committee had two members representing the 
NGO stakeholder group. It was actually an unofficial agreement that both had the op-
portunity to participate, as they were first set an official member and substitute. It con-
sisted of ministers, state officials and representatives of the nine stakeholder groups, set 
by the UN protocol set in Rio 20 years earlier. Notable is that although there were rep-
resentatives from relevant ministries (e.g. Environmental and Foreign Affairs), the Min-
istry  of  Social  Affairs  and  Health  did  not  have  a  representative,  and  this  was  seen  by  
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interviewees to represent the lack of interest in the social dimension of sustainable de-
velopment. 
The work on both groups seems to represents also the close connection that civil society 
actors  in  Finland  have  with  the  state  (Siisiäinen  & Blom 2009).  They  can  also  be  de-
scribed, following Berg and Hukkinen (2011, 151), to resemble “typical Finnish ad hoc 
forums” having a wide range of representatives coming from different backgrounds, and 
having been formed with a particular agenda. Both of the groups represent Finnish po-
litical culture in general but also the stakeholder-approach established by the UN. 
The NGO participants stated that in regards to the possibilities the official preparatory 
committee provided access to information about the preparations and current questions 
under negotiation were the primary functions. Taking part in it helped the NGOs to co-
ordinate their own work and provided possibilities to form and implement their own 
stands in to the discussions. 
The official UN process moved through several phases which had fixed deadlines to 
which the participants had to adapt if they wanted their statements to be heard. A reoc-
curring problem was that even though the official negotiation process structured the 
working  of  the  Finnish  participants,  the  timetable  was  in  many cases  unclear  to  them.  
This led to multiple occasion where there was very little or no time to react to situations 
where NGOs or other stakeholders were consulted. 
Three general themes are prevalent in the actions of Finnish NGOs and their representa-
tives. First, they focus on acquiring information from the official preparations and dis-
tributing this information to civil society at large. Second, they gathered information 
and statements from members (i.e. individual people and member associations) and 
built statements and claims based on these. And, last, they strive to influence the official 
policy-making, and national (Finnish) and regional (EU) documents that are to be fur-
thered in official arenas and the actual summit. These three are of course in many ways 
connected and inseparable, for example as agendas previously set by the summit organ-
izers as well as government officials influence the information that NGOs gathered from 
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their members. The themes named here are analyzed in the context of central events 
occurring in the preparation process. 
4.2?Group?formations?and?engagements?
I will now turn into describing the events that took place during the preparations. The 
whole preparatory process leading to Rio’s mega conference is of course too big to 
grasp, even when narrowed down to a national scale. Two developments are suggested 
as focus points for analysis, as they highlight different aspects of NGO participation. 
The  first  is  the  structuring  or  “streamlining”  of  the  NGO  group,  as  they  formulate  a  
common operating ground and invest themselves in certain agendas. This follows the 
events up until the beginning of 2012 as the so-called zero draft for the outcome paper 
is published (see UN 2012a). The second is the organization of a joint seminar that took 
place in March 2012, which sheds light to a process of raising awareness and engaging 
in discussion with both the “general public” and governmental representatives. Both of 
these bring forward different aspects of the group dynamics in the political network 
engaged in the preparations. It needs to be highlighted that this division is an analytical 
one and it is used to highlight certain central aspects of the actions of the NGOs. 
A common vision? Forming the NGO stakeholder group 
In the beginning of 2011 the NGOs begin to form the themes they want to promote in 
Rio+20. The summit is presented as one of the focus points of the Environment and 
development group, but only as one among others like climate negotiations, energy pol-
icy etc. Only gradually does the Rio+20 agenda take center stage, as later meetings in 
2012 deal with practically nothing but the summit preparations. In the first meeting of 
2011 the chairperson Rilli Lappalainen (Kehys) says that there is yet no forum for Finn-
ish NGOs to develop common grounds and that the group would be a “natural quarter 
for it”. When discussing the workings of the group, the participants agree that “influenc-
ing [policies]” is only one aspect, together with sharing information and building the 
capacity of the associations through cooperation (EDG 2.3.2011). 
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The Environment and development group was formed already in 2006 and it provided a 
“ready-made format” to following issues relating to development and environment, as 
one  interviewee  who  acted  as  the  chairperson  of  the  group  stated.  The  group  was  
formed when Finland held the presidency of the Council of the EU. Finnish associations 
took mainstreaming environment and development as the theme of their campaign in 
influencing the administration. As the Rio+20 negotiations started to progress, it was 
adapted to serve as a forum for coordinating the stands NGOs wanted to implement on 
the official negotiations. 
In the first meetings held in the spring of 2011 the NGO members are aware that the 
stakeholder group is still very unorganized when it comes to the Rio+20 summit and its 
themes, and see that raising awareness about the summit among different actors is cru-
cial. The NGO category is also seen to overlap with other stakeholder groups, and other 
actors assume that established associations would take a leading role. For example, a 
representative from Dodo ry. notes that many associations have specific and sometimes 
rather narrow objectives, connecting with their own specific field of interest, and it 
would be important to gather them under common stands which would increase their 
momentum – “to create some kind of a common vision” (EDG 31.5.2011). 
At a joint Rio+20 themed meeting on April 7th 2011 with the Environment and devel-
opment group and Finland’s chief representatives, Jouni Nissinen (FANC) sums up by 
asking if the NGOs really want to invest on the summit strongly, and are they willing to 
put time and effort on this (EDG 7.4.2011). Regardless of the frustration on stagnated 
international negotiations, the NGOs decide to invest themselves in the process, hoping 
that it would become an event where for example economic growth would discussed 
holistically in relation to ecological problems and global equality. 
When examining the political starting points the North-South division is seen as a cru-
cial one from the beginning. Countries and actors in general associated with the catego-
ries of “developing countries”, “the South” of “G-77” (the developing countries negoti-
ate in regional groupings or in regards to central issues, in the G-77 plus China group, 
see Vihma et al. 2011), are seen as fragmented and this should be taken into account 
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when forming NGO’s as well as Finland’s agendas. One participant points out that the 
South cannot be taken as a homogeneous whole, as those representing civil society have 
a tendency on promoting degrowth and being skeptical towards market economy, 
whereas  the  governmental  side  promotes  growth  and  social  development  as  a  primary  
objective. 
The contents of the agendas are still generally in an elementary stage, and many partici-
pants, representing both government and civil society, emphasize that discussions about 
the themes should be put forward. Discussion on the meaning and contents of green 
economy is mentioned frequently, and clarifying the relations of the three pillars of sus-
tainable development is also mentioned, as it would also help to bring actors focused on 
developmental and environmental issues together. As the representative of the Ministry 
of Environment, Kerstin Stendahl, states, there has already been a lot of discussions 
about the environmental dimension but the problem that remains is its relation to the 
other two dimensions. The records of the session conclude that, regarding the relations 
of the three pillars “all models are still on the table” (EDG 7.4.2011). Both civil society 
representatives and government officials see the discussion on the summit themes as 
open and in need of thorough discussion. 
The NGOs gathered information and stands from their members and experts during the 
process, and in later phases built their statements partially on these. In the summer and 
fall of 2011 FANC conducted a project, jointly with Kehys, that targeted the nine major 
groups and experts on the relevant issues, gathering views on what should be included 
on the Rio+20 agenda. This was done through an online survey and seminars, and the 
materials were also published as a compact brochure (see FANC 2011). According to 
the NGO members, the project was conducted with the aim of collecting stands in a 
coordinated way, and in this way to further the possibilities of influencing official poli-
cies. This was the first event that gathered and fixed stands and views from the stake-
holder groups, or civil society in general, in Finland related to the Rio+20 process. 
In FANC’s seminar where NGO members and government officials met, the Minister of 
Environment, Ville Niinistö (The Greens of Finland), told that Finland’s main goal is 
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the re-establishment of the spirit and approaches of the original Rio summit. By this he 
meant the way of treating global challenges and crises (such as the climate, energy, 
poverty, and financial crises) as integrated. One central goal was the decoupling of eco-
nomic growth and the use of natural resources. The solutions should hopefully lead to a 
paradigm change. He also noted that sustainable development is facing a double-
challenge: others have reached a high level of development, but with the expense of the 
environment, while others still struggle to satisfy even the basic needs. The gap between 
developing and industrialized countries, according to Niinistö, creates differences in 
opinions, and crossing this gap might be challenging. Specifically, he told that during 
the preparatory process it has become clear that the developing countries would not 
come along if green economy could not be established in a way which would ensure the 
reduction of poverty and the creation of new jobs. 
The proposals (FANC 2011) that came out of the project organized by FANC and Ke-
hys  presented  views  which  were  considered  as  necessary  elements  for  sustainable  de-
velopment. They emphasize the need to guarantee the satisfaction of basic needs for all 
humankind, giving a special emphasis on the needs of the “global south” and the prima-
cy of a rights-based approach. According to the statements, the focus should shift from 
the “power of capital to the power of the people”, and compulsory economic growth 
should be abandoned. A system of progressive environmental taxes should be imple-
mented, which would then provide for social security, equality and environmental pro-
tection. This kind of environmental fiscal reform,  which  would  shift  the  emphasis  on  
taxing the use of environmental resources, has been promoted by FANC already in pre-
vious years. The proposals refer explicitly to two ecological processes: the on-going 
mass extinction of species (biodiversity loss), and climate change,  both seen as results 
of human activity, and both also issues on which already the original Rio Earth Summit 
adopted  framework  conventions.  The  proposals  are  articulated  from  the  view  point  of  
what the developed countries should do and the main justification is their ecological 
debt towards others. (FANC 2011.) 
Other associations consulted their members and formed statements on the basis of these. 
These were then used as resources from which to draw from during the process, and in 
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many cases “fed into the system”, to use the expression of the NGO members, as stands 
from civil society were asked for official agendas. This is one way in which the associa-
tions were able to channel information from a larger base to the official preparations. 
The process of gathering views from members and experts and molding them to con-
crete and compact demands is of course a process of its own, which would be a point 
for close examination. Regardless, these agendas and reports worked as reference points 
to the NGO representatives on which to draw from when consulted about the view of 
civil society. The publications were also handed out in the public events during the 
spring, and as part of the project, FANC and Kehys also presented their paper to the 
Finnish parliament in 2011. 
The seminar set up the first reference points for the NGO group, and engaged civil soci-
ety actors and government officials with each other. Both presented similar claims and 
identified similar problems, including difficulties with green economy and the north-
south divide. Civil society actors stressed a more diversified picture of the North-South 
–divide, as government officials were more connected with relations between states, as 
could have been expected. 
The zero draft and the Finnish preparatory committee consultation 
In the fall of 2011, two channels of influencing official policies became current for the 
NGO group: (1) inserting NGO stands to the zero draft of the summit’s outcome paper, 
directly through the UN system, and (2) influencing the official stands of Finland 
through the official preparatory committee. These processes were handled simultane-
ously and partly connected, but still as separate. In the meetings of the Environment and 
development group some participants expressed views that it would be reasonable to 
form a single paper which would state all the common stands of the Finnish NGOs, but 
regardless of this,  two tracks were chosen. In Rio+20, as well  as in other similar sum-
mits, Finland operates as part of the EU and therefore the Finnish NGOs also took part 
in the EU process through regional civil society organizations. 
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Technical factors influencing the separation of the two tracks were the different timeta-
bles and formats of the two participation points, but it seems to reflect the changed situ-
ation as Tuuli Hietaniemi (nee Hakkarainen) (Kepa) and Jouni Nissinen (FANC) were 
now  assigned  as  members  of  the  preparatory  committee,  and  these  organizations  also  
took a leading role in gathering the views from associations and representing them in 
the negotiations. The records of the group mention this process being relatively straight-
forward amongst the NGO group, excluding few issues that gathered differing views 
(EDG 26.9.2011). But as this preparation was done through the above-mentioned asso-
ciations and the official preparatory committee, not much information is accessible af-
terwards. 
Taking part in forming of the zero draft paper is instead much more accessible. The pa-
per put together earlier by FANC, together with Kehys, was used as of the resources to 
construct the input of the Finnish NGO stakeholder group. At this point Kepa had taken 
a main role in coordinating the NGO group and it prepared a paper which served as a 
base for discussions. Both of these were discussed in the Environment and development 
group, as themes for the common comments were put together. Seven associations con-
tributed to the final document. One of them, Family Federation of Finland (Väestöliitto), 
took part in the paper even though it also had a person representing the Women’s stake-
holder group. Then again WWF (Finland) did not take part, as it promoted its stands 
through WWF International. Both associations had had a representative in many of the 
groups meeting during 2011, but the institutionalized connections set both by the UN 
system and the NGOs themselves resulted in this division. 
The Environment and development group settled on promoting three themes: (1) a 
rights-based approach that emphasized shared and basic rights for living and natural 
resources, as well as human rights; (2) focus on the use of natural resources and threat-
ened ecological processes; and (3) assessment mechanisms relating to the implementa-
tion of the previous themes. 
In the common statement paper, “Finnish NGOs’ Contribution to Rio+20 Bureau Com-
pilation Document” (FANC et al. 2011), sent to the UN, the NGOs start out by criticiz-
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ing the lack of implementation on international agreements on sustainable development 
made already in the 1992 Rio summit. They demand that social and environmental de-
velopment should be understood as being more important than economic goals. Explicit 
reference is made to extreme poverty, climate change, deforestation, the loss of biodi-
versity and to growing resource use. 
In the first section of the paper the NGOs state that the three dimensions of sustainable 
development are not in balance, and that a coherent and balanced way to combine the 
pillars is to adopt a rights-based approach. In addition to universal rights, this refers to 
the legality of the measures to be taken. Therefore, they demand that conventions on 
climate change and biological diversity are adopted, with concrete measures and timeta-
bles for implementation. The second section continues on this theme, as the NGOs de-
mand that human rights should be taken as the basis for sustainable development. This 
includes that all human beings should be guaranteed equitable access to energy, food 
and  clean  water,  with  also  rights  to  sexual  and  reproductive  health  and  integrity.  The  
overall argumentation is built on demands that emphasize binding agreements and un-
deniable universal rights in regards to both environmental protection and social issues. 
The specific section devoted to “Green Economy in the Context of Sustainable Devel-
opment and Poverty Eradication”,  one of the two official  themes of the summit,  states 
that the NGOs support the definition for green economy provided by UNEP which de-
fines green economy as one that “results in improved human well-being and social equi-
ty, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities”. But in 
addition to this they express concerns that the current economic crisis will endorse 
short-sightedness in the developed world, and that market mechanisms incompatible 
with climate and biodiversity conventions mentioned earlier will be adopted. Again 
awareness of the skepticism among the developing countries towards green economy is 
emphasized as a major concern, when considering the possibilities of the negotiations. 
As a result of this the Finnish NGOs emphasize the need to maintain the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” principle, set in place at the Earth summit, and also note 
that green economy should not establish systems that would make protectionist 
measures possible. 
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Green economy is seen as a positive development, but with reservations that the social 
aspect should not be forgotten and the economic aspect should not dominate. Even with 
an official definition, and two years of planning, the concept is still a fluctuating and an 
ambiguous one, carrying much skepticism with it, also among the NGO group. 
The final contribution to the zero draft from the Finnish NGOs then seems to closely 
reflect the statements made in the earlier paper by FANC. Both documents also mention 
specifically climate change and biodiversity loss – environmental issues set on the 
agenda in Rio 1992. The compilation document made by the seven NGOs also mentions 
marine resources and deforestation, which are missing from FANC’s report, even 
though they are an organization specifically focused on forest conservation in Finland. 
The claims made by the NGOs seem to come close to those stated by Finnish govern-
ment officials. Both the records of the Environment and development group and the 
interview materials show that the NGOs considered Finland as well as the EU to repre-
sent a rather progressive stand on the issues. 
Building public relations: jointly organized seminar and the plenary session 
of the Finnish parliament 
One feature of the preparatory process was the multiple seminars and public lectures 
that were organized during the spring. This section focuses on the one organized in 
March 21st 2012 as it was a joint effort of the NGO group and it had a specific aim of 
influencing the plenary session of the Finnish parliament. According to the records, the 
“demand”  for  the  plenary  session  to  focus  on  Rio+20  issues  was  made  by  the  former  
president Tarja Halonen (EDG 24.11.2011). 
In the beginning of 2012, the UN zero draft for the final outcome paper was published. 
As mentioned, regardless of the cooperation and agenda-formation the NGO group en-
gaged in, and the overall official preparations, many of the themes of the summit were 
still very much under formation. The zero draft is described by the Environment and 
development group’s documents to be “rather loose” and lacking genuine commitment, 
as well as lacking in commitments to actual funding (EDG 18.1.2012). In planning the 
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events and strategies for the spring and the themes that should be furthered in them, the 
NGOs are still undecided. Starting out from this setting, I will focus in this section on 
the work the NGO group engaged in when organizing a joint seminar and the objectives 
they had in it. 
Already at meetings in 2011 there were talks about organizing jointly a public event, 
which would both raise awareness and influence decision-makers. The idea of organiz-
ing  the  event  just  before  the  plenary  session  of  the  Finnish  parliament  to  influence  its  
members was also on the table. The records present the seminar as “means for deliver-
ing messages further and engaging in public discussion” (EDG 8.2.2012). 
The seminar was planned to bring together representatives from most stakeholder 
groups and official governmental instances to form interaction and exchange of ideas 
between different actors. Two panel discussions corresponding thematically to the 
themes of the summit were first planned, but as most stakeholder group representatives 
wanted to participate on the one discussing green economy, the one on the institutional 
reforms was put aside. The governmental side was represented in the schedule with 
presentations from officials, members of parliament and the Minister of International 
Development  Heidi  Hautala  (The  Greens  of  Finland).  The  panel  discussion  had  repre-
sentatives from most stakeholder groups, excluding the groups “children and young” 
and “indigenous peoples”. 
The seminar was held on March 21st 2012 at Eurooppasali, in Helsinki. In the beginning 
of the conference Rilli Lappalainen told that they had conducted a quick survey on the 
street by asking if people knew what Rio+20 was and what it was about. Almost no-one 
had  known  about  the  summit  and  those  few  that  knew  identified  it  as  environmental  
conference.  Also Heidi Hautala expressed concern about the fact that there were still 
differing conceptions of whether Rio+20 was going to be a human rights conference or 
an environment conference. Even though most participants saw this juxtaposition as 
erroneous from the beginning, this confusion underlined the competing discussions on 
what should be the main focus in Rio: economic growth, social rights or environmental 
protection?  
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The discussions in the seminar revolved around the concept of green economy and its 
connection to economic growth, as the organizers had set out to problematize this topic. 
Especially the decoupling of growth from the use of natural resources was a reoccurring 
theme. Even though the panelists and other speakers presented many examples on how 
they saw green economy and elements were essential to it, no clear consensus seemed to 
prevail. Many competing definitions were made, but still the participants also made 
clear that there was confusion on many of the central issues. 
The issue of growth was connected to the North–South-divide and the right to growth in 
the developing countries. In reflecting the skepticism of the developing countries to-
wards the strong environmental agenda of the industrialized countries, the representa-
tive of the Confederation of Finnish Industries (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto) stated that 
partly from that point of view, that to many developing countries development and eco-
nomic growth [are important]… we have strongly wanted to see it in a way that all as-
pects need to be integrated, and we have seen the concept of green economy so that, 
that we create growth and well-being by using natural resources sustainably (S2, Tuuli 
Mäkelä, Finnish business sector representative). 
The divide between the North and the South provided the main framing for the conver-
sation but it also legitimates growth. At the same time it was connected to many nation-
al or domestic issues. Both economic and population growth in the developing countries 
were seen as harmful to the environment, but the representative of SAK, the central or-
ganization of Finnish trade union, admitted that many sectors of Finnish industry de-
pend on production that can be seen as unsustainable. 
After the seminar the general consensus about it among the organizers was positive. It 
had received positive feedback from participants and some connections with members 
of parliament had been made as many had asked for a report on the seminar afterwards 
(EDG 2.4.2012). The records state that this was seen as a good sign especially when 
regarding the upcoming plenary session of the parliament, and as at least three members 
of parliament were going to Rio with the official delegation – one of them being Pertti 
Salolainen (National Coalition Party), who also held the closing address in the seminar. 
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In April 11th 2012, the Parliament of Finland held a plenary session (täysistunto) where 
the upcoming summit was discussed. An extensive preparation including multiple 
committees had been made before the session and the chairperson of the committee of 
foreign affairs, Timo Soini (The Finns party), started out by presenting a summary of it. 
He stated that the use of natural resources should not compromise nature’s diversity, 
biodiversity (to which Pertti Salolainen heckled “Well said!”), continuing that green 
economy should be seen as a possibility for future growth, and that considering Fin-
land’s expertise, the focus on the development of new indicators is well founded. (The 
Parliament of Finland 2012.) 
During the following discussion among the parliament members the growing concern 
about natural resources and the limits of their use was established as a crucial issue. But 
again it was noted, by Heidi Hautala, that binding agreements could not be achieved on 
an international level if they were not built on the principle of global justice (globaali 
oikeudenmukaisuus). She also stated that green economy makes it possible to show that 
sustainable development is also economically reasonable. All members of parliament 
who expressed their views seemed to agree that current growth trends were unsustaina-
ble and the need for change was urgent. Finland’s main objectives were stated to be 
water management and creating new indicators for measuring the progress of the agen-
das. These two themes and many other depictions about the situations the summit faces 
seemed to promote the picture of Finland as a high-tech country even more. Technolog-
ical know-how on for example clean water and sanitation issues, statistical expertise and 
overall the Nordic welfare model back Finland’s status in the negotiations. The minis-
ters  responsible  of  the  issues  dealt  with  in  Rio  thanked  the  parliament  for  the  discus-
sions and the minister of foreign affairs, Erkki Tuomioja (Social Democratic Party), 
concluded that it seems that they had the full support of the parliament for continuing on 
the chosen track. (The Parliament of Finland 2012.) 
The critique against economic growth and the resulting exploitation of natural resources 
from  unsustainable  growth  is  widely  accepted  among  actors  across  the  field.  NGO  
members as well as members of parliament and government officials seem to support 
the  idea.  This  may  seem  unintuitive  at  start,  but  has  been  noticed  by  other  studies  as  
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well. While studying growth and degrowth narratives among the members of the Fin-
land’s Committee on sustainable consumption and production, Annukka Berg and Janne 
I. Hukkinen (2011) found that it was common to criticize current growth-bound eco-
nomics,  also  among  those  actors  representing  the  business  sector.  But  de-growth  was  
not seen as a realistic solution as the narrative (see e.g. Latouche 2010; also Berg & 
Hukkinen 2011, 152) was represented as fragmented and incomplete, which further en-
hanced the status of growth, now reformulated in an “eco-efficient growth” context. 
This glance on the discussion at the Finnish parliament points to the same direction, as 
even though problems like population growth and unequal status of women were identi-
fied, the solutions provided were based on efficiency that results from new clean-tech 
solutions, which also provide national growth potential. 
The statements made in the plenary session discussion, as well as in previous instances, 
also resemble the views of the NGO group in many ways. Climate change, biodiversity 
loss and diminishing natural resources are the most concerning issues. The North-South 
division is seen as central, but somewhat contrary to the views of the NGOs, the solu-
tions presented in the plenary session are basically constructed by seeing Finland as 
providing ready-made, and mostly technical, solutions for developing countries in the 
context of green economy. It is acknowledged that decisions have to be made on an 
equal and just basis, but generally this importing of solutions forms the basic structure. 
The attitude towards green economy in general creates some distance between the 
NGOs and Finnish government representatives, as the NGOs seem to be more skeptical 
towards the new concept and see the need to bind it to previous agreements. 
4.3?Expertise?and?the?division?of?labor?in?civil?society 
Drawing on the above-mentioned, the associational field in Finland presents itself as 
highly connected through many official and unofficial instances. The Environment and 
development group had worked on the issues from 2006 and many of the participants 
who represented the associations knew each other rather well. This is in line with previ-
ous studies dealing with Finnish NGOs and their mutual connections. When examining 
Finnish associations in the World Social Forum, Ylä-Anttila (2010a, 69–74) noted that 
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common characteristics for the group of NGOs were that they are associations run by 
key actives who are in many occasions connected by personal ties. These two character-
istics also seemed to be present in the Rio+20-process. 
The setting of common relations between actives and an integrated field of associations 
leads to a feature in the work of the participants. Most of the interviewees used the same 
expression that basically “all of the world’s issues are on the Rio agenda” and this evi-
dently produces a challenge in handling the variety of questions at hand, of which some 
require detailed specialist knowledge. One way of dealing with this was the division of 
labor between different associations and their representatives. 
Certain issues and themes were considered to belong to specific associations or their 
representatives who possessed the expertise for it. Dividing responsibilities worked in 
both organizational setting, as for example Kehys is focused on the EU context, and in 
specific themes and environmental areas, e.g. climate change or biodiversity on which 
some other organizations possessed expertise. It exemplifies the institutionalized field 
of associations who can work in to some degrees based on their  common trust.  Actors 
could focus their  attention to narrower questions as they knew that somebody was still  
looking into the other questions. This trust is not only based on an established field of 
associational expertise, but on the fact that they knew each other well or had personally 
agreed on the matters. On handling the themes and topics of the summit, one interview-
ee summarized it by stating that 
It’s hard, it’s really hard to be able to handle it all and that’s why our [Environment 
and development, TL] group has been terribly good, because in it different people are 
following specific parts of the whole, that if Dodo is following things relating to cities, 
they can bring their expertise on that, and we know that we don’t need to follow those 
paras because they are already doing it, and this is in a way the model by which we can 
handle to whole, I can’t say I would know something about articles dealing with 
oceans … but I know that Jouni [Nissinen] has been looking into it, and that is where it 
is based, that we have expertise (I3, Finnish NGO representative). 
Therefore, many of the participants knew each other at least to some degree, and could 
apply already existing ways of working on building NGO stands on the issues at hand. 
But it was also noted, that the group had an uneven membership base regards to, for 
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example, the division between associations focused on development issues and those 
working on environmental issues (Table 2) and this “problem” ran through the whole 
process. On the issue of construction of common agendas the division between different 
kinds of organizations was acknowledged, but was not seen as a crucial problem 
amongst the group 
the rights based-approach rose to that paper made by Kehys … [and on the other hand, 
TL] those three points, sufficient food, energy and gender equality were put to that pa-
per made by FANC, which, as it is an environmental organization, is noteworthy that so 
many other dimension made it into it (I4, Finnish NGO representative ). 
These seem to be some competition on power to coordinate the stakeholder group, ex-
pressed for example in the changing position of (organizational) leadership in the group. 
But this does not raise any crucial conflicts as all of the participants understand that if 
the group is divided, it will not get anything done, as exemplified by the following 
comment 
the essential part in it is that if we want to do something together, we seek for the small-
est common denominator and operate together [on that basis, TL] … the kind of shared 
feeling is that these are common thing we are promoting (I1, Finnish NGO representa-
tive ). 
Conclusions:?who?were?the?participants??
This chapter has looked at the group dynamics within the political network of the pre-
paratory process and the agendas that were constructed during this process. Central ac-
tors were identified from the point of view of the Finnish NGO stakeholder group’s 
members, positing them the political setting they considered themselves to be situated in. 
In addition to central interest groups, the discussion on the theme of green economy and 
other issues relating to sustainable development were located and presented in an ele-
mentary form. They will be elaborated in the next chapter which focuses on green econ-
omy by means of justification theory (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006 [1991]; 1999). Be-
fore this, a short summary of the events is presented. 
The political network that gathered around the Rio+20 preparatory process consisted of 
well-established associations focused both on development and environmental issues. 
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Regardless of this division and the fact that a larger amount of the NGOs were focused 
on developmental issues, the stakeholder group emphasized both dimension. This was 
backed by similar views put forward by government officials. The ministers, with which 
the NGOs cooperated most visibly, Ville Niinistö and Heidi Hautala, both represented 
the  Greens  of  Finland,  and  for  example  the  Prime Minister  or  the  Minister  of  Finance  
were practically absent. 
Most burning environmental issues identified during the process were climate change 
and biodiversity loss as well as unsustainable use of natural resources, already set in 
place in the UN context by previous summits. The concern about unsustainable use of 
natural resources dates back to the Limits to Growth-report and the other two, climate 
change and biodiversity conservation, to the Earth summit, which established conven-
tions on both. The solutions to these contextualized most importantly to the setting of 
countries divided in the global north and global south. The discussions as well as the 
political  tensions  clearly  continued  from the  settings  that  have  been  in  place  from the  
Stockholm summit onwards (Schechter 2005, 31, 126; Seyfang & Jordan 2002, 20). 
Even though the preparations for the Rio+20 summit had been more or less going on 
from 2009 or at least 2010, the NGO group was rather disorganized in the beginning of 
2011. The representatives of Kehys ry. were able to steer the preparations to the Envi-
ronment and development group, which at the same time gave the group form and a 
leading position to Kehys. On these grounds the NGOs began their common coordina-
tion on agenda-setting. The dynamics changed as the official preparatory committee, led 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was set up, as the two NGO members appointed to 
the group took responsibility of collecting common stands from stakeholder groups. 
One thing connecting the Finnish actors – apart from the Confederation of Finnish In-
dustries – was the critique of economic growth. The NGOs set out to criticize growth-
based economics and gained support for this agenda also from official negotiators of 
Finland. Primarily, the critique of growth was linked with the global environment, in the 
form of global environmental problems (e.g. climate change) and diminishing natural 
resources – both issues previous UN summits. 
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??What?were?the?agendas?promoted??Dimensions?of?green?
economy?and?justice?
This chapter focuses on the debates on green economy. Actors identified in the previous 
chapter presented different conception what green economy should include, how social 
relations should be arranged according to it, and, ultimately, what kind of future it 
should produce for humanity. The flow of the “story” is disrupted in this chapter and the 
focus shifts on to the discussion and debate that revolved around the concept of green 
economy, as it was in the core of the struggles to define a common conception of a jus-
tified order, which all actors – or in grander terms, humanity – could consider to be the 
foundation of the future they wanted. I will analyze the competing moral orders related 
to green economy by the actors identified in the previous analysis. The primary materi-
als used in this analysis are the interviews conducted with key NGO actives and obser-
vations made in the Rio+20 seminars. 
The debate on the contents of green economy, and also the general theme of this chapter, 
situates in the tension between particularity and universality. A global summit focuses 
on thousands of global yet specific political issues and problems that need to be ac-
counted for, and, on the other hand, a concept like green economy needs to be contextu-
alized through political actions to which the participants and in the end the outcomes of 
the  summit  will  commit  itself  to.  But  at  the  same  time  a  common  conception  of  how  
these particular solutions and agendas relate to each other is needed. As practically all 
the Finnish participants declared: the problems should be seen as interlinked and as an 
inseparable whole – a stand of which the quote on the beginning of the chapter is a 
prime example. A common conception of a justified way to make equivalencies, to 
merge the pillars, ecology, economy and the social, was therefore needed. 
The zero draft paper of the summit exemplifies that green economy was posited as 
something that serves as means for achieving sustainable development: 
“We view the green economy as a means to achieve sustainable development, which 
must remain our overarching goal. We acknowledge that a green economy in the con-
text of sustainable development and poverty eradication should protect and enhance the 
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natural resource base, increase resource efficiency, promote sustainable consumption 
and production patterns, and move the world toward low-carbon development.” (UN 
2012a.) 
This was the overall theme that figured in all of the definitions: green economy was 
primarily posited as a future-oriented state of affairs, once established, providing for a 
sustainable future. It establishes the link between current practices and provides for the 
transition to a sustainable future. Or at least it was supposed to do this. As the discus-
sion on sustainable development has a strong position in the UN system, and as the con-
ference was established as a sustainable development summit, the concept green econ-
omy was situated in this context. 
I will start out by analyzing the discussion on the three dimensions of sustainability 
looking at how the different pillars and their combinations were understood by the NGO 
members. This is conceptualized as ways of communicating (Thévenot 2011a) the polit-
ical issues to a common arena and examining the central orders of worth (Boltanski & 
Thévenot 1999) that justify them. I will first discuss each of the three dimensions, eco-
logical, social and economic, separately as they have been seen to constitute the elemen-
tary  parts  of  sustainable  development.  From this  I  move  on  to  the  debates  concerning  
conceptions about their justified relations. The summit forms a critical event that brings 
up  the  imperative  for  justification.  It  is  a  test  of  strength,  in  which  worth  is  assigned  
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999; Boltanski & Thévenot 2006 [1991], 133–138), and which 
shows how different actors and, primarily, how different nation-states committed to 
sustainable development. 
5.1?Communications?and?orders?of?worth:? the? three?pillars?of? sus-
tainability?
First of all one thing should be made clear: almost no-one among the Finnish actors 
thought that the idea of three pillars, meaning separate columns for the ecological, eco-
nomic and social aspects, was a good way to conceptualize sustainable development. 
NGOs, youth groups and scientists saw it as inadequate and disconnected from the pre-
vailing situation and criticized it heavily (Clémençon 2012, 312). But still there seemed 
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to be no way out of the conceptual model of three pillars or dimension. It figured in the 
public discussions and in official papers, and if actors wanted to engage in discussions 
about sustainable development there seemed to be no way around this model. One as-
pect that emphasizes the situation is that instead of replacing the three dimensional 
model, suggestions were made that new pillars or dimensions should be constructed and 
added to the model. Discussions on whether for example a cultural pillar or a security 
pillar should be added to this in order for it to be a realistic model of sustainability. 
The three pillars and other similar models are ways of grasping the global and all-
encompassing agenda of sustainability, something that helps to bring issues together, as 
exemplified by one interviewee: 
in a way nothing is that simple, that it should work like this, but in a way it is, that from 
it, it is easy to get a picture in your head, and after that start thinking about what would 
be the concrete measures by which you reach it (I1, Finnish NGO representative). 
Agendas  and  claims  can  therefore  be  situated  in  this  “trinitarian”  scheme,  as  all  three  
dimensions have an institutionalized and legitimate status. Be they pillars or dimensions, 
for now sustainable development is fixed on this model (Harding 2006, 233). The dis-
cussion on green economy on the other hand could be seen as parting from this, for ex-
ample because the choice of words itself make reference to only two pillar, ecology and 
economy. But as the official theme of the summit already makes clear, it is green econ-
omy in the context sustainable development and poverty eradication. The notion was 
added to it from the beginning, tying it to the discussion that has a long history in the 
UN context. As was made clear in the previous chapter, this did not prevent green econ-
omy from being an ambiguous concept throughout the preparations and the summit it-
self. 
The fairly new concept raised skepticism amongst the participants, as it was seen to be a 
possible threat to already agreed principles and practices of sustainability. A common 
tendency for the NGOs and official negotiators was to situate green economy as a sub-
concept of sustainable development, having to include the basic principles of sustaina-
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bility. These attempts to connect the two concepts worked most clearly through making 
references to the principles agreed on at Rio in 1992. 
The ecological: limits and boundaries 
A central reference for the ecological dimension was the notion of planetary boundaries 
that refer to the model created by a team of 29 Earth system researchers, led by Johan 
Rockström of the Stockholm Resilience Institute (Rockström et al. 2009a; 2009b). The 
model  builds  on  the  discussion  that  dates  back  to  Limits  to  Growth  report  and  to  the  
carrying capacity of the Earth’s ecosystem. As was stated in chapter 4, in the NGO 
agenda-building concerning the environmental dimension three issues emerged as par-
ticularly central: climate change, biodiversity loss and diminishing natural resources. 
The planetary boundaries model was able to encompass all the processes and incorpo-
rate them into a single frame of reference. 
The agenda-building was backed by the stands put forward by Finland’s official negoti-
ators. Many other environmental issues, such as deforestation, desertification, oceanic 
acidification, the arctic region etc. were of course discussed, but these three were the 
most central. What the conceptions about all of these natural processes have in common 
is that they are caused by human activity and that they were presented as undeniable and 
unavoidable preconditions that must be taken into account in the negotiations. 
The overall conversation on environmental issues continued on familiar grounds, al-
ready  set  in  place  in  the  1970s,  taking  the  global  ecosystem  and  its  limits  as  starting  
points. There is only so much that the global ecosystem can handle and, with a sort of 
ceteris paribus assumption on existing technology, this sets limits which humanity can-
not go around. Referring to the current state of the environment, a NGO representative 
states that 
the science world is beginning to be pretty unanimous about the fact that we are ap-
proaching some of these irreversible threshold values, this planetary boundaries think-
ing is, the Rockström study is the most known, but equally as well these … mocked pre-
dictions of the Club of Rome from the 70s, that the latest data shows that they hold true 
surprisingly well and they say that somewhere around the year 2020 some of these nat-
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ural resources, there will begin to be scarcity in a scale that it will affect the world 
economy (I2, Finnish NGO representative). 
The speaker makes reference to the model created by Rockström and his team in the 
Stockholm Resilience Institute, and connects this to the conversation about the “limits 
to growth” set forth by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972). All interviewees made 
reference to “planetary boundaries” and it was also mentioned in all of the seminars 
which are used as materials in this study. Johan Rockström also gave a presentation in a 
seminar discussing the Rio+20 issues, and which was held in Helsinki in May 2012. 
The planetary boundaries model (Rockström et al. 2009a; 2009b) examines the state of 
the environment through the Earth’s capacity to endure environmental change resulting 
from human actions and is set in the context of different critical threshold values not to 
be exceeded. Rockström and his colleagues have put forward the idea that humanity has 
entered  a  new phase  in  geological  time,  which  is  a  result  of  industrial  production  and  
the effects it is having on the Earth’s ecosystems. In the previous period, the Holocene, 
environmental change occurred naturally on its own terms, and this period of approxi-
mately 10,000 years provided a relatively stable domain in which the resilience of the 
planet remained at a safe range. 
However, starting from the Industrial Revolution, which marks the dawn of a new peri-
od, the Anthropocene, human actions have been the “main driver” of ecological change 
(Rockström et al. 2009b, 472). They state that “[t]he Anthropocene raises a new ques-
tion: ‘What are the non-negotiable planetary preconditions that humanity needs to re-
spect in order to avoid the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental change 
at continental to global scales?’” (Rockström et al. 2009a) 
To this new phase, Rockström’s team suggests a model that identifies nine different 
processes (two of them not yet quantified) of which each connects to a critical value and 
which establish the so-called planetary boundaries. The most commonly known of these 
processes is (anthropogenic) climate change, of which proposed parameters are the con-
centration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and radiative forcing as “the rate of en-
ergy change per unit area of the globe as measure at the top of the atmosphere” (Rock-
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ström et al. 2009b, 473). Another commonly known dimension is biodiversity loss, 
which is operationalized through the rate of extinctions. The nine dimensions set out 
different variables that can be measured and monitored individually, but also notes that 
they are highly interconnected as “one boundary is transgressed, then other boundaries 
are also under serious risk” (Rockström et al. 2009b, 474). 
 
Figure 1 Planetary boundaries visualized: climate change, biodiversity loss, and the nitrogen cycle 
are presented as already transgressed boundaries. Source: Rockström et al. 2009b 
Even though the model is considered new and has not yet gained accepted status 
throughout the scientific community, it was not brought up during the Rio+20 prepara-
tions. In fact, in the feature published in Nature (Rockström  et  al.  2009b)  there  is  a  
small summary box in the beginning which includes the text “Road to Copenhagen”, 
referring to the COP 15 Climate summit held in Copenhagen in 2009. 
In his presentation held in the Finnish parliament on March 19th 2012, the secretary 
general of the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development, Sauli Rou-
hinen, also exhibited the planetary boundaries model, stating that 
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discussion on the limits of the environment started in 2009 when Johan Rockström and 
a team of 28 researchers brought up the concept of planetary boundaries and thresh-
olds, and this has in a way become the icon of sustainable development which illus-
trates the operating space we humans and our economy has (S1, Finnish government 
official). 
Rouhinen also continues by stating that the boundaries are a new way to define the lim-
its which the Club of Rome first identified. This model was therefore promoted highly 
throughout the field, both Finnish and other NGOs, government officials as well as the 
Secretary General’s High-level panel (GSP 2012), which was co-chaired by the former 
president of Finland, Tarja Halonen. On the first day of the summit, the UN Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-moon, introduced the video called “Welcome to the Anthropocene”, 
which also promoted the model. In the statements made by the stakeholder groups on 
the first day of the summit the representatives of the NGOs stated that “we cannot have 
a document without the mention of planetary boundaries, tipping points and earth’s car-
rying capacity” (IISD 49.) 
The visual presentation of the boundaries (Figure 1) makes the situation promoted by 
Rockström’s  team quite  clear  with  its  red  sectors  and  their  arrangement  which,  with  a  
bit of imagination, resembles another anti-symbol of the environmental movement, the 
nuclear warning sign. The model builds on the foundation that current environmental 
change  is  a  result  of  human  actions,  moving  it  from  a  domain  of  the  natural  environ-
ment to a cultural and moral context of consequentialism. 
Rio+20 of course discussed many other issues than what the planetary boundaries mod-
el includes.  A common expression among the participants was that “all  of the world’s 
issues are on the agenda at Rio”. Even still Rockström’s team’s model works as an ex-
ample on how the environmental dimension was perceived. Nature is the undeniable 
ground on which everything else rests on and is the precondition to everything else. If 
the global ecosystem were to collapse, understandably all other issues are also compro-
mised. 
This  sets  the  environment  to  a  place  where  it  is  primarily  separated  from for  example  
having economic value (denouncing the market worth) and posited as having an intrin-
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sic  value  of  its  own.  The  order  of  worth  by  which  the  ecological  dimension  is  under-
stood is the green world (Latour 2003; Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 2000, 256–263), as 
it is posited as being valuable on its own terms and not as an instrument to produce oth-
er forms of wellbeing. It is backed by scientific proof and expertise, associated with the 
industrial worth, but it works as a supporting justification primarily related to its credi-
bility. The value of nature and the value of avoiding a looming ecocatastrophe posit 
nature also as means because it is supporting human societies. This was also a popular 
argument, crystallized in the numerous claims which stated that without a working and 
healthy environment, all other things are lost. 
The overall rationale for the ecological dimension comes from the attempts to establish 
the tests of the green worth so that they are unquestionable, based on science and that 
we should value nature on “its own terms”, according to the natural and ecological pro-
cesses that are beyond human definitions. The tests are ultimately tests of sustainability 
(Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 2000, 241) that are formalized through the planetary 
boundaries. 
The cognitive category for its understanding and communication is the (environmental) 
scientific model and the boundaries the environment sets. This makes it possible to see 
the ecological dimension in a quantifiable way, but in a non-economic manner as would 
be the case with the market worth. The threshold values set as planetary boundaries op-
erate by grounding the tests for measuring the green order of worth, and could also 
build a bridge towards binding and legal agreements – associated with the civic order of 
worth. 
The social: human rights and equal distribution 
The environmental dimension understandably connects with nature conservation, sci-
ence and to the work of environmental NGOs. The social dimension on the contrary had 
a more diverse role, even though the main focus was in many ways connected to devel-
opment, the relation between the “global north” and the “global south” and the work of 
developmental (or solidarity) associations. Primarily it connects with the civic order of 
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worth, in emphasizing both the need for procedural democracy and legality as well as a 
just  distribution of wealth.  The tension between these two forms of civic worth is  pre-
sent in various issues regarding the social pillar. 
The Finnish NGOs stated clearly that decisions have to be based on a rights-based ap-
proach. This implies the notion that human rights have to be linked to developmental 
issues, situating poverty in the global south as a question of equality concerning all. 
Everyone should be granted the same access to the basic necessities of life, which 
would include food, clean water etc. Also the right to pursue a way out of poverty 
should be seen as universal. A concrete agenda that was mentioned was the promotion 
of a treaty that would establish the Aarhus Convention on a global scale, providing citi-
zens access to environmental information and environmental justice. The implementa-
tion of the approach was described so that 
it [the rights-based approach, TL] would be like the base for everything, the starting 
point should be that every human being on this planet has for example the right to wa-
ter and food, decent treatment, providing for themselves and their families, and thing 
like that (I3, Finnish NGO representative). 
Appealing to a context that works on the basis of human rights has been noted as a cen-
tral way of operating among NGOs and social movements (Ylä-Anttila 2010b, 292). It 
is a highly institutionalized way of making demands and works as a commonly recog-
nized – if not always implemented – frame of reference. The rights-based approaches 
“seek to link the development enterprise to social movements’ demands for human 
rights and inclusion, and to tie development to the rhetorical and legal power of interna-
tionally recognized human rights” (Nelson 2007, 2042). Grounding the claims on uni-
versal and global rights and equal possibilities to finding ways out of poverty seems to 
go well with the conceptions the NGOs had of the developing countries. 
Nevertheless, a more delicate and nuanced picture of “the south” can be given. The ap-
proach the Finnish NGOs promoted worked on the basis of individual rights, provided 
for all citizens. They state specific agendas such as “strengthening democracy and civil 
rights” and ensuring transparency on corporate lobbying (see e.g. FANC 2011) as being 
central. This kind of eradication of poverty is not necessarily the same as providing the 
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possibility for economic progress on a national scale. The rights-based approach specif-
ically emphasizes the relations between the government and its citizens in promoting 
democratic structures (about the approach see Kepa 2011). Civil society does not set 
itself against the state but, on the contrary, builds its agendas on approaches that operate 
through the legal status that only governments can provide (Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 191). 
The issue of poverty eradication as an overall agenda was seen by the NGO representa-
tives to have an almost unquestionable status in the UN context and therefore being al-
most as without any need for justifications. This has already been exemplified by the 
notion that green economy as such was not enough to qualify as a theme and had to be 
connected with the notion of “sustainable development and poverty eradication”. De-
spite the lack of a need for explicit justifications, the underlying order of worth here is 
the civic world.  It is understood as binding legal agreements, equal global distribution 
and universal human rights. 
The demand for binding legal agreements can be understood as representing the democ-
racy aspect of the civic world (or in some cases a combination of the civic and industrial 
worth, as clear and binding rules are seen as an efficient way of reaching preferred 
forms of social justice). The acknowledgement of the right to develop and to distribute 
wealth in an equal manner on the other hand can be seen as a manifestation of the jus-
tice aspect of the civic world. (Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 150–151.) The rights-based approach 
attempts  to  combine  these  two,  as  it  takes  universal  human rights  as  its  starting  point,  
but also conceptualizes global poverty as an injustice caused by the marginalizing, dis-
criminating and abusing actions by others (see Kepa 2011, 5). 
Gender equality was another central question situated in the social dimension. It was 
promoted as being a universal human right (civic worth) but also from the point of view 
that it produces multiple positive side-effects (industrial worth supports green or civic 
worth) like restraining environmentally and socially harmful population growth. For 
example the common statement produced by the Finnish NGOs argues that 
“Promoting sexual and reproductive health and maternity services as well as sexual 
rights helps solve other development issues such as reaching balanced population de-
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velopment, mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, alleviation of poverty, fa-
vourable economic development and realization of gender equality.” (FANC et al, 3.) 
Through the notions of human rights and an agreement that only democratic societies 
can be sustainable, does the social pillar also require an intrinsic value and a rigid status. 
But its place is also promoted through its side-effects, which can be understood as justi-
fications based on the industrial order of worth. The promotion of the social dimension 
can be said to have worked through two tracks. Even though it has the established set-
ting of universal human rights on its side, it is still in need of supporting justifications. 
This can be illustrated through the discussion that revolved around the third unofficial 
theme of the summit, the construction of new indicators. Attempts to construct alterna-
tive means for measuring development and progress can be seen as a way of forming 
tests and quantifying the social dimension. The new indicators relate also to the envi-
ronmental dimension and to the reforming of the economy dimension. But they would 
also provide for establishing rigid norms and frameworks for conceptualizing the claims 
the NGOs as well as developing countries were promoting, and it also builds on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approach already in place in the UN system. 
Still, agendas building on the MDGs and those geared towards establishing human 
rights on a wider scale should be seen as in many ways distinct processes. 
The MDGs can be seen to represent a utilitarian ethic that posits the situation through a 
desired goal. The human rights approach on the other hand pose a more normative claim 
operating through an established intrinsic value of human beings and their certain needs. 
(Nelson 2007, 2045.) The MDGs therefore represents the civic democracy dimension, 
whereas the right-based approach is more of a form of civic justice. 
The economic: means and menace 
In a way, the economical pillar or dimension as such received the least attention in the 
talk  of  the  NGOs.  It  was  mostly  presented  in  a  straight-forward  manner  as  a  tool  or  
means to strive for other goals, and would gain its contents through this. This makes it 
rather hard to be discussed in the same manner as the previous ones, as most mentions 
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connect it the other dimensions. Specifically, this formulation criticizes the intrinsic 
value  of  the  economy pillar  assumed by  the  NGO members  to  be  the  agenda  of  most  
other groups. But on the other hand, the established tripartite model legitimizes the eco-
nomic dimension and on a conceptual level gives it equal status by the other two – pil-
lars should be in balance, and therefore the economic dimension is a legitimate one next 
to the other two. 
Understood by the terms of justification theory, the NGO members approach the econ-
omy dimension by denouncing the market world as such. The economy dimension was 
characterized through the operating of free markets but also through distorted market 
mechanisms (e.g. subsidies provided for environmentally harmful practices). Solutions 
based on the logic of the market order of worth can be acceptable only when restricted 
by other orders of worth, most prominently by the civic and green worth. In other cases 
an economic model based on the market order of worth in itself was seen as being harm-
ful to the environment and social justice. For example, the green economy section of the 
joint statement made by the Finnish NGOs recommends to 
“[M]ake a fundamental change in economic policies from liberalisation to a regula-
tions-based policy aiming not only at economic growth but at social equity and respect 
for ecological limits” (FANC et al. 2011, 5). 
A  clear  common  ground  for  dealing  with  economic  issues  among  the  NGO  members  
was the critique of growth in general and the status of GDP in measuring progress and 
development.  The latter of these was also connected to the third theme of the summit,  
the construction of new indicators for measurement, which emerged during the negotia-
tions in the spring of 2012. The current growth-based thinking was described to be 
harmful from the start to the other dimensions, and therefore in need of revision. As was 
noted in the previous chapter, many hoped that Rio+20 would have been a place to dis-
cuss the growth paradigm. 
I bet that in the negotiations these is a charming agreement about that, that it is men-
tioned, that yes these dimensions have to be in balance, but it still is the economy that is 
churning … there’s such a strong faith in the economy, that you just need growth and 
thing will sort out, but it isn’t quite true, because that growth comes from unsustainable 
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development, so it’s like what goes around comes around (I1, Finnish NGO representa-
tive). 
Conceptually, the problematic nature of the economic dimension is embedded in both 
sustainable development and green economy. In the latter case the word economy obvi-
ously raises questions about giving a primary status to economic growth but also in sus-
tainable development the second word was usually understood as being a possible refer-
ence to growth (e.g.  McManus 1996; Levallois 2010). The approach taken to economy 
is an attempt to bring its status down, in a way to the level of the other dimensions, or as 
subordinate to them. Another interviewee also refers to this hierarchy by stating that 
you need to have a comprehensive view of things and the starting point needs to be peo-
ple and nature, ecosystems, and economy is meant to be serving that, and currently, at 
least in a mainstream picture there is something weird, that the economy itself needs to 
grow and everything needs to be geared towards that” (I5, Finnish NGO representa-
tive). 
A similar idea is supported by for example Tarja Reponen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
the head of the Finnish delegation 
most important in this would be that in economic policy-making social and environmen-
tal aspects would be genuinely taken into account – this not working with us [in Finland, 
TL], even though we are so good in carrying out sustainable development, and even 
less it is working on a global scale (S6, Finnish government official). 
Obviously actors do not start the construction of the model from a clear table, but from 
a setting that has been established over the years in international politics on develop-
ment and environmental issues. As the common contribution of the Finnish NGOs pro-
claimed, “the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable develop-
ment are not in balance” (FANC et al. 2011, 1). The definitions for the different dimen-
sions do not grow out of nothing, but from a setting of institutionalized power relations 
which they attempt to criticize. In this way the debate starts out from the dominant posi-
tion of the economic dimension and sets the tone for its  definitions,  positing it  as sec-
ondary: 
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the economy is just a tool, the world is doing fine [without it], both nature and even 
man have been doing well for millions of years without an economy like the one we cur-
rently have (S6, Jouni Nissinen, Finnish NGO representative). 
Two reservations have to be made into the views on economy both on the NGO and the 
Finnish  governmental  sector  had:  first,  the  economy  was  not  of  course  completely  
flawed, as long as it could be combined with ecological and social motives, and second, 
purely economic motives should not be associated with the business or corporate sector 
alone. In the first  case the NGOs and Finnish actors in general  in a way promoted the 
expansion of the economic dimension, as it should widen the range in which costs and 
benefits  are  calculated.  This  discussion  was  situated  most  commonly  in  the  context  of  
accounting for externalities, meaning that economic and social cost should be added 
into the calculus and not be treated as external to it. The latter notion refers to the con-
ception that even though the economy is situated as an integral part of sustainable de-
velopment,  in  real  life  it  operates  as  a  domain  of  its  own.  Trade  negotiations  between 
states operate on the basis of purely economic premises and environmental or social 
aspects do not have a mainstreamed role in them. 
The conference also took place in the context of the current global financial crisis, set-
ting the tone for talks on funding. Discussions on development and the restriction on 
using natural resources bring up questions of development aid and especially the EU 
was not able to make pledges on funding. The market situation was seen by the Finnish 
NGOs as possibly leading to solutions that were not designed on long-term or just basis. 
They state that “[S]hort-sightedness of the market system is a major reason why devel-
opment and economic growth are not green, and political leadership is needed to main-
tain the long term perspective in times of financial and economic crisis” (FANC et al. 
2011). 
5.2?Critiques,?compromises,?combinations?
Each  of  the  pillars  or  dimensions  was  posed  as  overriding  the  others  by  some  group.  
This nods again to the direction that the three-dimensional pillar model is a combination 
61 
 
 
 
of interests, coined to satisfy a group of heterogeneous actors coming from very differ-
ent starting points. 
The environment is a concrete element which has nonnegotiable limits in the views of 
both environmental scientists and the NGOs. These limits and boundaries are a way of 
conceptualizing nature as an entity of its own, something that operates through its own 
laws and on which everything else is dependent on. It should therefore be posited as the 
starting point (the green worth). The social dimension on the other hand is based on 
common rights granted for all human beings as well as nations. Equality and the right to 
pursue an equal status is also an undeniable and requiring center stage positioning (the 
civic worth). Almost none of the NGO members nor the government representatives in 
Finland placed primacy on the economic dimension, but as the degrowth discussion or 
alternative ways of seeing the economy seemed to have severe problems on becoming a 
dominant narrative (see Berg & Hukkinen 2011; Levallois 2010), the economy re-
mained also as a necessary element. It is also legitimized by the dominant cognitive 
model,  the  three  pillars.  The  basic  formulation  of  this  was  the  dominant  growth-based  
market economy (the market worth). Most of all, it was stated or assumed to be the pri-
mary motive of other actors. In the following sections I will focus on different ways of 
combining the dimensions which were analyzed above. 
Nature first – the rest will follow 
When discussing the relations of the dimensions, some of the NGO representatives, as 
well as some government officials, started out from the premise that ecology occupies a 
primary role and the other dimensions come after that. This combination model can be 
understood as a hierarchical or a consecutive model. The dimensions form a consecutive 
model in which ecology comes first and others have to operate according to it. The con-
secutive nature of the model is a result on situation where all three dimensions are his-
torically institutionalized as being legitimate and necessary for sustainable development.  
Limited to the pillars model, a modification to it was made: the ecological pillar needs 
to be tipped over and set on the bottom so that the other two pillars can be constructed 
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on its founding. This was common for both NGOs and government representatives. 
Jukka Uosukainen, the director of Foreign Affairs in the Ministry of Environment, said 
that 
these three pillars have been put to people’s heads all wrong, the environment pillar 
should be on the bottom as the founding, then there are the social development and 
economy pillars that stand on the environment pillar, and that’s how it will bring well-
being to people (S6, Finnish government official). 
This sets forth a combination model which does not operate from the basis of an equal 
compromise between the pillars, but from the viewpoint that sustainable development or 
green  economy cannot  be  achieved  in  a  completely  positive  way.  The  primary  role  of  
ecology simply cannot be combined so that the two other dimensions retain their “origi-
nal” form. As one NGO representative explained it, when approaching the issues one 
needs to first note that 
the carrying capacity of the planet is here, and what is economically possible build on it, 
and this is done in a way that is socially as sustainable as possible … it will not be iden-
tical with economic profitability, so that I think it’s completely misleading to talk about 
green economy as being automatically some kind of a win-win solution (I4, Finnish 
NGO representative). 
This statement does not give much operating space even for the social dimension, as its 
sustainability is dependent on the possibilities of environmental sustainability (“as sus-
tainable as possible”). The strongly proclaimed status of ecology seems to contradict the 
fact that many of the participants were very well aware that this would not work in the 
negotiations, as noted above when describing the social dimension. The records of the 
Environment and development group state one participant saying that from 
the point of view of the South, the idea of the intrinsic value of nature is almost always 
interpreted as Northern colonialism, in which nature rather than humans are protected 
(EDG 20.11.2011). 
Using this kind of consecutive model is one strategy to understand the relations of the 
dimensions: defining them on their own and then juxtaposing them in a preferred order. 
Another simplified variation of this would be to say that societal development is the 
primary goal and nature conservation has to be sacrificed before this. 
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Two ways of approaching the problems are therefore present in the views of the NGO 
representatives. There is either a “consecutive model” in which one dimension and or-
der of worth gets a primary role and the others are limited by it; or attempts on forming 
a compromise between different orders of worth by denouncing the possibility of sepa-
rate definitions, and defining the dimensions as interconnected entities by different cog-
nitive categories. The latter can be described as the “the combination model” and it will 
be discussed in the next section. Both of these models seem to be in use among the 
NGO group but  there  is  no  clear  strategy  on  which  is  the  official  one  or  how do  they  
relate to each other. 
Stabilizing the environmental scientific way of understanding the ecological dimension 
to the planetary boundaries model provides it communicability through a somewhat 
clear model of measurable and quantifiable and interconnected variables. It also fits 
together with the understanding of the global environment as a system of interconnected 
processes, building on established environmental scientific as well as political concep-
tions leading back to the Limits to Growth –report (Meadows et al. 1972). But at the 
same  time  it  fixed  the  ecological  pillar  to  a  form  that  proves  to  be  incommensurable  
with its political counterparts: neither the economic nor the social pillar have the flexi-
bility to adjust to the primary status given of ecology in the official negotiations. Eco-
nomic growth is presented as crucial and therefore cannot be risked by binding ecologi-
cal paragraphs. 
In many instances economic growth is also connected to the social dimension (under-
stood as societal development) which is also presented as more important than ecology, 
as was the case for example with the Brazilian government: 
Brazil stated it clearly at Rio that for example this environmental dimension is not that 
important, that to them the social dimension is the most important (I2, Finnish NGO 
representative) 
In the quote, the social dimension refers specifically to development. Human beings 
come first – but as separate from nature. The conception about the views of the Brazili-
an government, presented in the above quotation, show that the three-dimensional mod-
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el is the primary focus and the dimension have to be at least put in order, even though 
one would not accept limits or boundaries of the environment. But the same interviewee 
also stated that this is not at all limited to the developing countries: 
when Nokia closes down factories Finland’s prime minister sees that now we can’t af-
ford to go dabbling with sustainable development, that now is the time to go and hug 
those workers there in Salo, so in that it is emphasized somehow that deep down the 
right order of things is that those social [aspects, TL], when it concerns people and 
communities directly, those get easily emphasized in sustainable development thinking 
(I2, Finnish NGO representative) 
The stands the NGOs took in regards to the environmental dimension are very under-
standable. Multiple references were made to the increasing concern about ecological 
limits that the science and technology stakeholder group was trying to bring in to the 
conversation. The inclusion of the planetary boundaries to the draft text coincides with a 
major scientific conference “Planet Under Pressure” held in London, which promoted 
the idea of planetary boundaries among others. The dimension of ecology, connecting to 
the green worth, was capable of travelling through the preparatory process as the plane-
tary boundaries – not least thanks to also its understandable visualization (Figure 1) and 
the great measures the science stakeholder group took. 
Possibilities of a compromise: models beyond the pillars 
In a Rio+20 related seminar held in June 2012, two weeks before the summit, Mika 
Railo (Kepa) stated in his presentation that 
these are of course scientific problems, but the solutions are political (S5, Finnish NGO 
representative) 
With this Railo was referring to the simple fact that many political decisions, like for 
example environmentally harmful subsidies, produce problems which can be studied 
and identified scientifically. The primary message is that if only there would be political 
will, changes could be made. But in my view it can be taken also in another way if one 
considers what would be the solutions. It is a critique towards political decisions which 
are made on the basis that credits only instrumental value to nature. 
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Another way of approaching the issue of how to conceptualize sustainable development 
was to deny the possibility of seeing sustainable development as consisting of separate 
pillars and creating ways in which they are defined as intertwined or as mutually consti-
tuted. In this way the notion of “pillars” was explicitly questioned and alternative visu-
alizations were taken up. What is noteworthy is that even when heavily criticizing the 
“pillars”, the talk is still structured around three dimensions and their combinations. 
Many conceptions that were presented in various instances brought up examples that 
combined two of the dimensions through a particular solution. Green economy as a 
concept and green growth can itself be seen as an example of this category, in formula-
tions that presented it as making a new kind of environmentally friendly economic 
growth possible. These solutions present the ecology-economy pair in a form that can 
be understood as a compromise between the market worth and the green worth. An en-
vironmental fiscal reform, promoted especially by FANC, operates by forming a market 
solution that is compatible with principles of protecting the environment. Environmen-
tally designed taxes and subsidies or carbon trading mechanisms are other examples of 
this way of finding solutions. 
I would see it that if for example solar power would be more affordable and for exam-
ple oil heating would be made more expensive, that you would at the same time support 
the alternative, people could definitely put two and two together and move to more sus-
tainable means of production without anyone telling them so (I1, Finnish NGO repre-
sentative) 
Even though these kinds of solutions also gathered a lot of criticism – for example be-
cause they operate through a growth based capitalist economy and ignore more funda-
mental economic changes – they were presented as solutions that could be fairly easily 
included in the current economic system. They can operate through a way in which the 
environment is quantified by both scientific and economic means. This is of course a 
feature that both dimensions have in common. 
Green economy, green growth and similar solutions are able fit into the demands of 
economic growth by promising green jobs and environmentally acceptable means of 
production. But the compromise of the two worlds (industrial/market and green worth) 
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was seen to denounce or at least sideline the third one, which was the main justification 
for the developing countries and development organizations (civic worth). From the 
viewpoint of the developing countries the compromises that were able to form combina-
tions out of the ecological and economic dimensions were defined as “green protection-
ism”  or  as  mechanisms  that  give  no  room  for  the  developing  countries  (the  social  di-
mension) (EDG 20.11.2011). The compromise between the green worth and the market 
worth was claimed to be actually a disguise for actions that based on the domestic world, 
the emphasis on national and domestic production on the North (for similar argumenta-
tion, see Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 182). 
The planetary boundaries model served as a starting point for creating new combina-
tions. The Finnish NGO members made references to the model created by Oxfam, 
which combines the planetary boundaries to complementary “social boundaries” (Ra-
worth 2012). The model is based on the idea that the Earth’s boundaries in regards to 
natural resources and ecosystemic limits have to be “respected” but, in addition to this, 
sustainability requires also that people have the necessary resources to fulfill human 
rights. These two sets of boundaries – as the planetary boundaries setting the outer cir-
cle and the social necessities forming the inner circle, together forming a doughnut 
shaped ring – limit the operating space for humanity, and visually create a doughnut 
shaped figure. 
The “Oxfam doughnut”, as it was referred to, therefore combines the two dominant dis-
courses present in the negotiations: Rockström’s team’s model and the Brundtland 
commission’s idea about the connection of development and environmental protection. 
The “safe operating space for humanity” (Rockström et al. 2009b) of the planetary 
boundaries is shaped into “a safe and just space for humanity” (Raworth 2012). It is 
noted that “[P]olicies aimed at moving back within planetary boundaries can, if poorly 
designed, push people further below the social foundation” (p. 5). Policies designed 
only on ecological premises, such as tree plantations that provide for carbon credits, can 
benefit the environment but also offset people from their homes and drive them to a 
more deprived situation. The model not only stresses the interconnectedness of the 
planetary boundaries but also their connections to poverty – and vice versa (p. 16). Pov-
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erty eradication, on the other hand, is not seen as compromising ecological limits, as the 
other side of the model is reductions to the life style of the world’s richest countries. 
The model combines dominant frames which the NGOs were promoting: ecology is 
seen as forming through the planetary boundaries model; the social as through human 
rights; and economy is reformulated in a way that it does not treat the previous two as 
“externalities”, referring to them as external costs, but operates within the norms they 
set. Commenting the “doughnut” model, a Finnish NGO member summarizes the ap-
proach:  
we should first think from an ecological and social perspective, that what are the plane-
tary boundaries in which we are living … [and] what is the basic minimum what all 
people sort of need, basic needs, basic rights satisfied and after that think how the 
economy works so that these two conditions are fulfilled (I1, Finnish NGO representa-
tive) 
This  view presents  the  situation  in  a  somewhat  similar  way as  the  “nature  first”  view,  
but the combination model makes it possible to present both planetary boundaries and 
human right at the same time – and both in a nonnegotiable manner. The Oxfam discus-
sion paper (Raworth 2012) as well as other publications and comments by NGOs then 
present multiple examples on how development is achieved in an environmentally 
friendly manner, and how nature conservation is done so that it will not compromise 
development goals. 
The doughnut forms a compromise between the green worth and the civic worth and 
states that they can both be achieved at the same time. The “safe and just space” estab-
lishes actions that take both worths as it starting points, but sees them also as mutually 
reinforcing. The establishment of the civic worth provides for achieving the green worth, 
as for example a democratic and non-corrupt society establishes the sustainable use of 
natural resources. The establishment of the green worth helps to avoid natural disasters, 
backs up food security and so on, giving rigidity to the civic order. Both orders of worth 
help to control the political and biophysical complexities that the current situation pro-
motes. But again, the compromise made between two worlds denounces the third, the 
operations based on the market order of worth. This is not a perfect solution if one 
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wants to integrate all dimensions of sustainable development, but an acceptable solution 
for the Finnish NGOs who set out to criticize economic growth in the first place. 
When it comes to green economy, the same kind of formulation can be found in its def-
initions  as  in  the  definitions  for  sustainable  development.  As  I  pointed  out,  most  saw  
these two concepts as interchangeable or as forming a single discussion. A particular 
point of reference in this is that those NGO members who accepted the use of the con-
cept  emphasized  the  word  “inclusive”  as  requirement  for  it.  Inclusive green economy, 
promoted especially by representatives of Kepa, but also for example Pekka Shemeikka 
(one  of  the  head  negotiators  of  Finland),  refers  to  a  very  similar  definition  as  the  
Oxfam’s model. To the question of what is green economy 
As such not a goal, but means to achieve sustainable development … We must talk 
about inclusive green economy, participatory (osallistava) economy (S4, Pekka She-
meikka, Finnish government official) 
From our [Kepa’s, TL] viewpoint the economy is always a tool, not an intrinsic value of 
its own, growth is a tool to reduce poverty and increase well-being … justified from the 
point of the environment and from the point of people, it must work by the limits set by 
people and the environment, that’s the starting point, it must be human rights-based, it 
must guarantee the right to develop for the developing countries environmentally sus-
tainably, and it must respect these -92 Rio principles (S4, Tuuli Hakkarainen, Finnish 
NGO representative ) 
The last reference that emphasizes the “Rio principles” refers to the notion of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” set in place at Rio 1992. Inclusiveness and the prin-
ciple  of  common  but  differentiated  responsibilities  (as  well  as  other  agreements  from  
the Earth summit) were the central ways of making the concept of more appealing to the 
developing countries. 
5.3?Institutionalized?justifications?on?sustainability?
The idea of limits (limits to growth, planetary boundaries, the Earth’s carrying capacity 
etc.) is an institutionalized ways of making sense of the global environment (which is 
itself  an  institutionalized  way  of  perceiving  these  problems,  see  Yearly  1996).  These  
limits are on the other hand firmly connected to the idea of a tripartite sustainable de-
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velopment, which is a central institution in the UN system. These models have their 
manifestations in official documents, reports and organizational structures, and are con-
stantly brought up by actors participating in political communication (Thévenot 2011a), 
even though none of the conception have gained a firm unquestioned status. 
These institutions, which have regulative aspects, can also be understood as constituted 
by habitualized conduct (see Gronow 2006). The regulative aspects refer to the fact 
parts of the institutions are formalized in documents and organizational structures, as 
mentioned above, but they are also constituted by habitualized ways of acting and per-
ceiving. The institutions encounter multiple obstacles as different political actors fight 
for their own particular causes, but this has not resulted in the abandonment of the old 
habits. Instead, as I have shown, the responses are the multiple variations of the habits 
in which actors adjust their  conceptions  and  agencies  on  the  basis  of  the  historically  
formed institutions (Ylä-Anttila 2012a, 258-259), as was the case in, for example, creat-
ing new models of planetary limits or in the case of adjusting the pillars model. 
This pragmatist approach to the political network and to the justifications present in it 
helps to understand the combinations between the different orders of worth presented 
above. Since the Brundtland report and the Earth summit mainstreamed the idea that 
development and environmental conservation are intertwined and as global markets are 
seen to be the context for them (forming “the three pillars”), the different orders of 
worth have been conditioned by each other (Barbier 2011). The “political possibility 
structure”, or political culture, can be understood as institutionalized practices that have 
formed as a result to previous political struggles and compromises. On the other hand, 
the cognitive models that help to make sense of political issues or to formulate issues as 
political and common, the “collective action frames” (Benford & Snow 2000), on their 
part can be conceptualized as habitualized ways of solving problems, and which have 
also formed in previous situations (Dewey 2006 [1927]). The institutionalized settings 
and the cognitive frames in action here can therefore be understood as connected and 
mutually constituted (Ylä-Anttila 2010b, 292–295). 
70 
 
 
 
The three pillars as well as adaptations which try to solve the troublesome relations be-
tween them situate into this context. They also form the setting to the relations between 
the  different  conceptions  of  justice,  the  plural  orders  of  worth.  In  the  case  of  the  
“doughnut model”, for example, the compromise between the green worth and the civic 
worth conditions (Ylä-Anttila 2010a 188–194) the market worth. This is backed by the 
combination in which the civic worth also implies (pp. 199-203) the achievement of the 
green worth, and vice versa. But in the version “nature first” (the consecutive model) 
the green worth is set as primary, conditioning the civic worth, and what is left of this 
sets the conditions for the market worth. What is relevant here is that the institutional-
ized understanding of both sustainable development and the dimensions of it set the 
context for the orders of worth. 
According to Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 374–375) compromises are weaker than 
justifications that base their logic on a single order of worth. In a compromise two dif-
ferent orders of worth are forced together and both condition and limit each other. If one 
of the worths situated in the compromise would be followed truly, it would lead to the 
abandonment of the other. This logic provides some insight to disputes about sustaina-
ble development. Clear and well defined models should be established so that the com-
binations of different orders of worth would be achieved. But in a state where sustaina-
bility  is  a  combination  of  different  orders  of  worth,  forced  together,  there  is  always  a  
possibility that one “pillar” will dominate and leading to the crumbling of the already 
shaking and uneven structure. 
Conclusions: what were the agendas? 
The discussions and debates on green economy and sustainable development were built 
on the discourses and models that have been developing from the first UN environmen-
tal summits onwards (Schechter 2005; Barbier 2011). The new model of planetary 
boundaries situated in the context of the environmental limits, but it also encountered 
the same counterparts as the old models – economic growth and justified relations be-
tween the global north and south – and this position put it against them. 
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The pillars model posits the three dimensions as equally important for sustainable de-
velopment. In the light of the above mentioned formulations, as well as the interest con-
flicts presented in the previous chapter, it is quite understandable: it is a model that tries 
to bring a heterogeneous group of actors together onto a political arena which would be 
equal  to  all  participants.  At  the  same time it  creates  a  situation  where  the  participants  
need to work with a model that makes it increasingly hard to form compromises, even 
on a conceptual level. It limits the possibilities of forming integrative models as the pil-
lars are set as reflecting diverging interests from the beginning. 
The NGOs (and Finnish actors in general) were able to formulate the ecological pillar 
and the social pillar through single orders of worth, which gave them clarity and stabil-
ity as agendas. The scientific model of the planetary boundaries, among others, gave the 
ecological pillar a link to the intrinsic value of nature, understood here as the green 
worth. The human rights frame on the other hand provided a context for the social pillar, 
which is situated here to the civic order of worth. Both of these give the pillars rigidity 
and a firmly institutionalized setting on which to ground them. But in attempting the 
reformulate the pillars or dimensions model, the NGOs still implemented the conception 
of the intrinsic or unquestionable value of nature, which was known to be unacceptable 
to many of the other negotiators. The agendas investing on the green worth, as such, did 
not fit in to the constellation of power relations. It was distinctively a project of the de-
veloped countries or more specifically for example the EU – and the situation in Rio de 
Janeiro  turned  out  to  be  rather  different  from what  the  “Northern”  actors  were  hoping  
for. 
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??How?did?it?turn?out??The?outcomes?of?Rio+20?and?inter-
national?relations?
The previous chapters have focused on the developments which established the setting 
for the actual summit held in Rio de Janeiro. They provide the tools for understanding 
the events and outcomes of Rio+20, which is the focus of this chapter. The primary 
source is the outcome document “The Future We Want” (UN 2012b)2. The document is 
analyzed by looking at how it deals with the themes identified to be central in the pre-
paratory process and in the agendas of different relevant groups. This is done by putting 
it into context with other materials and the analysis conducted above. 
The outcome document addresses the issues in a profoundly different way when com-
pared to the negotiation process. Some of this variation is of course the result of the 
emphasis taken on the previous chapters. I have focused on the environmental problems 
that the NGOs presented as central and to how these issues relate to other dimensions of 
sustainable  development.  But  the  different  tone  of  the  outcome  document  also  repre-
sents the clear disconnection between different actors and the differing possibilities of 
these actors to achieve their goals. 
I will first go through the dimensions of ecology and development, as they were identi-
fied to be a central competing pair in the negotiations. In the reactions to the outcomes 
of the summit, made both by Finnish NGO members in the interviews and by other ana-
lysts, the unequal emphasis on the dimensions was also seen as a central outcome. From 
this I will move on to the formulations on green economy in the outcome document and 
to the international status of the so-called emerging economies, most notably Brazil. 
 
                                               
2 References to the outcome document are made according to the paragraph (“para”) numbers of the doc-
ument as is customary in other sources and in the talk of the actors taking part in the negotiations. 
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6.1?The?ecological?and?social?dimensions?in?the?outcome?document?
Conceptions  about  the  divisions  between  the  “North”  and  the  “South”  as  well  as  be-
tween environmental and social or developmental issues were continuously presented as 
elementary division lines in the preparations. In this section I will analyze the outcome 
document of the summit to see how are these divisions present in the text that came out 
as the result of the difficult negotiations. What follows is in clear contrast to the agendas 
set by the Finnish actors: ecological issues are sidelined as the social aspects dominate 
the resolutions. 
Ecology sidelined 
The primary status of ecology and the urgency of current environmental problems were 
the most central agendas of Finnish NGOs as well as the EU – and the resolutions on 
the ecology dimension also proved to be one of the biggest disappointments. In a panel 
discussion  held  after  the  Rio  summit,  all  NGO  representatives  as  well  as  government  
official expressed their disappointment towards the summit outcomes. Almost all of 
them stated that this was due to the failure of agendas related to the environmental di-
mension and its disconnectedness in relation to other dimensions. When asked about the 
biggest disappointment, Jukka Uosukainen (Ministry of Environment) replied 
the world didn’t wake up, the limits to growth were not recognized, time is running out 
and the risks are getting bigger … apparently only this generation is to be maintained 
and to be made wealthier … it shows in all of these texts, especially where, with the EU, 
everywhere where these limits of the planet were promoted they didn’t get through (S6, 
Finnish government official) 
The absence of the sense of emergency and definite limits in regards to the ecological 
dimension was brought up by many others in the panel and in other instances. In an in-
terview (which was made after the summit), one NGO representative commented the 
situation 
the world’s governments were  acting like we could afford to wait for Rio+40 and even 
Rio+60 before we have to start worrying about the planetary boundaries or other 
things exceeding the Earth’s carrying capacity (I2, Finnish NGO representative) 
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The first zero draft paper published in January 2012 makes reference to the “earth’s 
limited natural resources and on the carrying capacity of the ecosystems” (UN 2012a, 
Para 11.) to which unsustainable development puts stress on. As the negotiations ad-
vanced the notion of “planetary boundaries” was indeed momentarily added to the zero 
draft text (SciDev.Net 28.3.2012), but was eventually left out of the final outcome doc-
ument. 
Raymond Clémençon (2012, 317) states that the “text in Paragraph 39 [of the outcome 
document, TL] is cause for one of the biggest disappointments for many major groups, 
particularly environmental and youth groups. There is no mention of planetary bounda-
ries, limits to the carrying capacity of the world, or the intrinsic value of nature to be 
found anywhere in the final document.” There is a mention in this paragraph that “some 
countries recognize the rights of nature” (para 39.; emphasis added) but the general no-
tion is just that humanity should “live in harmony with nature”. The main objective and 
the fundamental criteria the NGO group had, in regards to the environmental dimension, 
proved to be almost completely unsuccessful. 
The two central ecological dimensions, climate change and biodiversity, are present in 
the outcomes, with separate sections devoted to them. It is affirmed that “climate 
change is one of the greatest challenges of our time” (para 190.). It is global by its na-
ture and therefore requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries (para 191.). 
Still, the document only notes with grave concern the remaining gaps in between the 
emission mitigations needed and the current situation and makes no new contributions 
to the issue. 
In regards to biodiversity, its “intrinsic value” alongside with “ecological, genetic, so-
cial, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic” values and 
the “critical role in maintaining ecosystems” (para 197.) are affirmed. Urgent action for 
halting the loss of biodiversity is called for (para 198.). The text in the biodiversity sec-
tion is what was hoped by environmental organizations to be the general approach to the 
ecological dimension. 
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However, these are both phenomena – climate change and biodiversity conservation – 
already covered by specific framework conventions and therefore not of crucial im-
portance to Rio+20 as single or isolated issues. Rio+20 does not particularly add any-
thing to them nor does it connect them to a wider context. At this point it should be re-
membered that the critique towards growth and urgency to set up new means of operat-
ing were backed by global environmental issues, of which climate change and biodiver-
sity loss are the most central and well-established.  
From the viewpoint of justification theory, the central means of arguing for the im-
portance of the ecological pillar is shifting more clearly towards the industrial order of 
worth. Scientific knowledge is still promoted as providing the accurate means of han-
dling environmental issues, but the main reason for the rise of the industrial justification 
is that the ecological dimension is seen mainly as natural resources. Paragraph 30 gives 
an example of what the marching order is 
“We recognize that many people, especially the poor, depend directly on ecosystems for 
their livelihoods, their economic, social and physical well-being, and their cultural her-
itage. For this reason, it is essential to generate decent jobs and incomes that decrease 
disparities in standards of living in order to better meet people’s needs and promote 
sustainable livelihoods and practices and the sustainable use of natural resources and 
ecosystems.” (Para 30.) 
The “sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystems” is mentioned here, as it is in 
many other cases.  Even still,  it  is  now ecology, not economy, that is  posited as a tool.  
Only “the poor” and deprived are stated to depend on the ecosystem directly, which is a 
clear reference to the applied timescale (“no sense of emergency”), a character of the 
outcomes  as  well  as  the  negotiations  which  was  criticized  heavily  by  the  NGOs in  all  
phases. Large scale ecosystemic collapse is inconceivable to the countries involved on 
the  basis  of  the  outcome document.  The  ecology pillar  is  almost  completely  sidelined  
and put to the position where it is legitimate only in supporting poverty eradication and 
societies like small island states (e.g. paras 14. and 33.) so undeniably threatened by 
climate change and the rising sea level. 
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The summit dealt with multiple thematic issues addressing environmental, social and 
economic issues like cities, climate change and small island developing states. But one 
thing completely missing from the negotiations is the arctic region. It could be seen as 
partly included in for example climate change, but the use of natural resources in the 
region is not even mentioned in the document. 
it is a good symbol for the paradox we have now, that when the ice is melting due to 
climate change, rather than being worried and doing something to our fossil fuel de-
pendency we think of it as great, now we can go and drill even more and there are good 
new routes for us (I4, Finnish NGO representative). 
The arctic region as well as oceans and their ecosystems were particularly in the focus 
of the NGOs. A campaign to “save the arctic” was launched by civil society actor dur-
ing the summit, but opposition from the United States, Canada and Russia prevented 
any resolutions in the government-level negotiations. Rio+20 does not address any time 
table for protecting oceanic resources or to stop overfishing. 
A strong emphasis on the social 
Instead of the urgency of a looming ecocatastrophe, promoted by the Finnish NGOs and 
civil society actors in large, the most crucial issue in the outcome paper is the eradica-
tion of poverty. The outcomes of the summit emphasize the central role of poverty erad-
ication and the special status of poor or developing countries in regards to almost all 
aspects dealt with. 
From the very beginning the outcome document has a very strong emphasis on the so-
cial dimension and it stresses the deprived situation of the developing countries and 
their right to development. The first paragraph of the document renews the commitment 
to a three-dimensional sustainable development (further establishing its position), and 
the second one immediately sets the overall tone by stating that 
“Eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an in-
dispensable requirement for sustainable development. In this regard we are committed 
to freeing humanity from poverty and hunger as a matter of urgency.” (Para 2.) 
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The main focus is on global equality in regards to material well-being and the current 
state of unequal development. The social dimension and the civic justice approach dom-
inate the results. The developing countries were in many cases against the implementa-
tion  of  strict  regulation  policies  as  they  feel  that  they  do  not  have  the  capacity  to  pro-
duce the information needed for them.  
The rights-based approach is not so prevalent as a means of grasping the issues. Rather, 
the right to develop and improve one’s status and well-being is set in the context of sov-
ereign states. Human rights, the equality of human beings and international law, for ex-
ample, are of course mentioned, but improvement and development aspects are articu-
lated in the context of nation-states. 
The Westphalian principle sets the stage for a more complex picture of negotiations 
than  what  is  provided  by  the  regime of  public  justification  alone.  Sovereign  states  are  
connected to each other by binding treaties and agreed common principles. But the no-
tion of sovereignty makes it possible to act by the regime of plan and argue one’s claims 
through the liberal grammar (Thévenot 2011a; 2011b). Nation-states have the right to 
pursue their own goals and other nations should not interfere in national affairs. The 
promotion of particular interests is acknowledged for example in the use and ownership 
of natural resources and in the right to pursue development in a particular context. 
The human rights approach also works through particular issues or as a supporting fac-
tor for the rights of nations. As was mentioned earlier, one of Finland’s themes was the 
focus on water and sanitation issues. The paragraphs concerning water and sanitation 
(paras 119.-124.) were mentioned by many Finnish actors to be one of the successes 
coming out of the conference, even though the right to water and sanitation is reaf-
firmed in the document, and has been recognized already by the UN's General Assem-
bly. Paragraph 121 states that safe drinking water and sanitation are human rights, 
which should be guaranteed for all. The human rights based approach to sustainable 
development makes it possible to make this claim, even though clean water is in many 
ways considered to be a resource that is becoming the target of increasing competition. 
The water and sanitation paragraphs illustrate another central aspect not to be forgotten: 
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safe drinking water and sanitation are to be “progressively realized for our populations” 
but with “full respect for national sovereignty” (para 121.). 
Water issues also provide another angle to the agendas promoted by different groups 
and the relation between them. In the third PrepCom there were talks about whether to 
include mentions of “transboundary water issues” (IISD 42.) into the text. Formulating 
the references to marine ecosystems and natural resources in this way could be used to 
implement conceptions which bind countries to a common, global environment, as is 
the case with climate change and the combination “desertification, land degradation and 
drought” (para 205.). Some of the Finnish NGO representatives promoted this kind of 
ideas, specifically related to ocean acidification which threatens marine ecosystems and 
therefore food security in a large scale (S3, S6). The paragraphs of the outcome docu-
ment dealing with oceans and seas (paras 158.-177.) do adopt a language that contextu-
alizes the issues through the Earth’s ecosystem, but no mention of transgressed national 
boundaries is made. 
The paragraphs dealing with gender equality (paras 236.-244.) show that some of the 
claims have made it to the final document. Many of the participants feared that ques-
tions of reproductive health and women’s role in family planning could be used to lock 
the negotiations, as there was diverging conceptions about them already among the EU 
countries. The outcome document reaffirms the commitment to previous agreements 
and action plans, and commits to promoting “universal access to safe, effective, afford-
able and acceptable modern methods of family planning” (para 241.) but does not ad-
dress the right (for women) to access birth control methods. Most of the paragraphs 
seems to correspond with the demands of the Finnish NGOs, although the causal rela-
tions between gender equality and environmental protection which were emphasized 
before are not that clearly present. On a general level it is recognized in the document 
“that gender equality and the effective participation of women are important for effec-
tive action on all aspects of sustainable development” (para 242.). One of the achieve-
ments in regards to women’s rights was taken in regards to ownership, as the document 
“resolves” to  
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“undertake legislative and administrative reforms to give women equal rights with men 
to economic resources, including access to ownership and control over land and other 
forms of property, credit, inheritance, natural resources and appropriate new technolo-
gy.” (Para 240.) 
The strong social emphasis corresponds with many of the claims made during the pre-
paratory process. But the reactions to it relate strongly to the fact that this is clearly dis-
connected from the idea of sustainable development as an integrated whole (even 
though this is formally declared in the beginning of the document). Paragraph 6 under-
lines the general approach taken by stating that 
“We recognize that people are at the centre of sustainable development and in this re-
gard we strive for a world that is just, equitable and inclusive, and we commit to work 
together to promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development and 
environmental protection and thereby to benefit all.” (Para 6.) 
Again, even though environmental protection is mentioned, the order of things is con-
structed in a rather opposite way than in the Finnish NGOs’ claims. People and the so-
cial dimension are posed as primary and the ecological dimension is conditioned by the 
other two. The ecological dimension with its urgencies is of course only one side of the 
picture and matters like hunger, lack of sanitation or basic human rights are the burning 
issue. But, regardless of the attempts to connect the pillars, things are mainly as para-
graph 6 states: people are in the center. 
6.2?What?became?of?green?economy??
The section of the outcome document that deals with green economy (in the context of 
poverty eradication and sustainable development) can hardly be said to be what it  was 
posited to be in the first place. The theme, first set to provide for a sustainable future 
and promoted strongly by the EU, is almost dealt with suspicion and reservations. It is 
contextualized most clearly by, first, connecting it to previous binding agreements; sec-
ond, as something that provides for the increased well-being of different peoples and 
groups, not nature; and, third, to seeing it as an instrument of global growth. All of these 
themes were identified as being elements of the social dimension (the civic order of 
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worth). The paragraphs dealing with green economy (paras 56.-74.) are therefore shaped 
strongly by the prevailing north-south –relations. 
According to the document, green economy policies should not contradict international 
law or each country’s sovereign right to natural resources. It should also respect all hu-
man rights. It is also conditioned by previous agreements, such as the Agenda 21. Con-
necting the green economy discussion to the 1992 Rio principles, such as the “common 
but differentiated responsibilities”, was also promoted by the Finnish NGOs. 
Bound to previous principles, green economy should instead further “the provision of 
financial resources, capacity-building and technology transfer to developing countries” 
(para 58f), contribute to “closing technology gaps between developed and developing 
countries” (para 58i) and increase the well-being of indigenous peoples, women, chil-
dren, youth and all occupational groups. Green economy therefore also has a strong 
emphasis on the social dimension, understood as development and the well-being of 
people. The ecological dimension is present in some paragraphs: 
We recognize that urgent action on unsustainable patterns of production and consump-
tion where they occur remains fundamental in addressing environmental sustainability 
and promoting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems, regen-
eration of natural resources and the promotion of sustained, inclusive and equitable 
global growth. (Para 61.) 
This side of green economy – the growth and development side – seems to be the domi-
nant one and, as was already noted, the intrinsic value of nature is practically absent. 
Green economy seems to be a combination of two pillars but, a bit surprisingly, not out 
of economy and ecology. Instead its primary elements are economic development and 
the unequal situation of the developing countries – which also connects to overall eco-
nomic and societal development. On reflecting the prospects of Rio+20 from the view-
point of Latin America, Maria Onestini (2012, 33) said that “the discussions accompa-
nying this new construct [green economy, TL] are mainly oriented toward the interface 
between economics and the environment” and that it ignores aspects of social justice. 
Quite the opposite can be said of the results. 
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What the section does have in common with the views presented in the preparatory pro-
cess  is  that  it  provides  little  clarification  to  what  green  economy  actually  is  or  how  a  
transition to a “green” economic system is achieved. It operates through a language also 
characterized by the suspicion towards it and which states that “different approaches, 
visions, models and tools available to each country, in accordance with its national cir-
cumstances and priorities” (para 56.). This is a clear reference to the reservations pro-
jected towards the concept as it underlines that green economy should not bind coun-
tries to new principles and leaves its implications open and to the hand of sovereign 
nations and other actors. 
The conceptions about green economy can therefore be seen as a point that exemplifies 
the division between the developed countries of the north and the developing countries 
of the south. As Jouni Nissinen (FANC) is quoted saying on Kepa’s announcement on 
their website (Kepa 2012): 
The formulations about the second theme of the summit, green economy, were left slim. 
Green economy is a concept that was born to the developed countries’ own discussion 
and which is now offered to the developing countries with too little foundations. The 
governments of the developing countries and civil society have been doubtful towards 
the idea of green economy from the beginning (Jouni Nissinen, Finnish NGO repre-
sentative, translation TL). 
Taken in this regard, the NGOs were able to promote their agenda successfully. Green 
economy  was  dealt  with  more  and  more  skepticism  as  the  preparations  went  on  and  
eventually it was linked to previous agreements – most notably to those agreed at Rio in 
1992. The rejection was successful but at the same time the NGOs were unsuccessful 
with their environmental agenda, also part of the green economy discourse. 
Green economy was designed to be a solution common for all, and this was not ac-
ceptable for some of the countries or groups. Neither was it compatible with the NGOs’ 
conceptions about the feasibility of economy-based solutions or the division between 
the North and South. What the green economy section in the outcome document and the 
discussion leading to it did establish, was the fact that from now on discussions on 
green economy and green growth are deeply connected to agendas of the developing 
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countries, which build on the social and economic dimensions. This exemplifies that the 
idea of the limits of nature is actually highly institutionalized among the actors who 
come from industrialized countries, not necessarily on a “global” scale. 
The negotiations can therefore be described through disconnections that prevailed on a 
fundamental level between the countries. The concepts and themes that were set up to 
bring the parties together were in no way successful. The preparations in Finland can be 
seen to have operated through the regime of public justification, in which actors strived 
to  find  ways  to  form  common  good  and  collective  around  this.  In  forming  the  NGO  
stakeholder group among Finnish actors as well as in engaging with government offi-
cials,  different  actors  and  groups  were  able  to  find  common  ground.  The  national  as  
well as regional preparations operated through notions of common worths. However, 
the results of the actual summit and the deadlocked situation in it indicate that a shift to 
the liberal grammar of the regime of plan and of interest politics between sovereign 
states. The established agreement on the need for global equality backs the system 
which provides rights for every state, but hinders the possibility to find common solu-
tions.  Previous  agreements  and  international  law  conditions  state  actors,  but  also  pro-
vides them with the possibility of pursuing particular goals (Thévenot 2011b, 48-49). 
One of these solutions would have been to bind all actors to the limits of common envi-
ronment, which transgresses national boundaries. But as I have shown, this option was 
effectively rejected. 
But there seem to be two conflicting conceptions among the Finnish NGOs. On one 
level they opposed the green economy approach, but on the other hand they were also 
convinced – even after the summit – that genuine communication between the develop-
ing countries would have produced a common understanding. In their view, for example 
the question of green economy being just a new form of protectionism could have been 
solved if different parties would have just sat down to discuss it thoroughly. Before the 
summit, Mika Railo (Kepa) stated that 
in this green economy issue the developing countries need to look into the mirror, it is 
opposed in the developing countries’ camp quite strongly, the possibility of a new form 
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of protectionism is seen in it … and that is a misconception … that just isn’t the case 
(S5, Finnish NGO representative). 
And after the summit, Jouni Nissinen (FANC) stated that green economy is a concept 
that carries a lot of suspicion and confusion with it, and as a solution somebody should 
have just went on the spot to meet with the other side face to face: 
somebody should have the resources to go around for example South America’s civil 
movements and to have conversations with them … the concepts are just understood all 
wrong, that it hampers the conversation, that the conversation is not brought to its con-
clusion and that brought about misunderstandings (S6, Finnish NGO representative). 
Even though this is of course just an idea which would have been impossible for one 
person to execute, it gives an example of how the disconnections between the different 
actors were perceived. The different countries are not genuinely discussing the issues 
that form the divisions between them and real conversation between the participants 
would have been able to solve the problems. Those who rely on rationalistic science as 
justification, also have faith in rational, enlightened actors. 
The two interpretations circling around about the conclusions on green economy seem 
contradictory but can nevertheless be interpreted to exemplify the division between the 
North and South. At the same time the events that led to these resolutions can be taken 
as further evidence that point towards the new position of the so-called emerging coun-
tries, most clearly of Brazil, the host of the summit. 
6.3?The?emerging?economies???emerged?
Reacting to the possibilities and failures of the summit and its outcomes, all of the NGO 
members interviewed referred to the lack of political will and especially to the lack of 
leadership in the negotiations. Analyses of previous summits have also stressed the im-
portance  of  a  strong  leader  figure  like  for  example  Maurice  Strong  in  the  case  of  the  
Stockholm 1972 (UNCHE) and Rio 1992 (UNCED) summits (Schechter 2005, 118). In 
reflecting on this theme and the role of the EU, one NGO representative stated that 
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yes there was a certain leadership lacking in this, EU did try it in regards to substantial 
issues, but structurally it was done all wrong, like from the point of lobbying, the EU 
did not know how to lobby it to others on time (I3, Finnish NGO representative). 
In substantial issues green economy was the theme brought up most prominently by the 
EU,  and  as  Pekka  Shemeikka  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs)  stated,  in  his  view the  EU 
had been “the driving force” in the negotiations (S4). Jukka Uosukainen (Ministry of 
Environment) also stated that in his view the EU's role ever since the Stockholm summit 
(UNCHE) has  been  to  promote  the  concern  that  natural  resources  are  running  out  and  
that the development of the developing countries cannot be achieved by the unsustaina-
ble use of natural resources (S6). 
The EU has indeed been implementing sustainability principles into its policies since 
the original Rio summit as well as the Johannesburg summit, but due to its actions on 
for example unsustainable agriculture and fishing policies as well as its provisions for 
environmentally harmful subsidies, its position as a leader in the negotiations was dealt 
with skepticism (Stocchetti 2012). As always, the question of money was a central fac-
tor, as the credibility of EU’s claims depended also on its willingness to provide devel-
opment aid. This was conditioned on the ongoing financial crisis in the Eurozone. 
Therefore, the summit might have been lacking a leader who would have been able 
bring the parties into a consensus that would have established the issues the industrial-
ized North and the EU were promoting. But the summit was not in a complete lack of 
leadership, as during the negotiations at Rio in June, many participants thanked Brazil 
for its efforts and leadership on the deadlocked situation (IISD 48. & 50.). The EU and 
agendas promoting environmental values encountered strong opposition in the summit, 
and many saw this to be culminated in the actions of the host country, Brazil. 
The  negotiations  had  come  to  a  state  where  there  was  no  way  of  completing  them  in  
time (if it would have been possible at all). Just days before the actual high-level sum-
mit the negotiations were in a state where a significant proportion of the text was still 
being discussed and parties could not agree on the wording to be included in the final 
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document. In this situation the Brazilian officials took charge of the negotiation groups 
that were in a stalemate and soon offered a new text to be accepted. 
This can be partly used to explain the strong emphasis on the social dimension found in 
the outcome document. The Brazilian government promoted agendas which connect to 
the social dimension, again understood through the right to development and to pursue 
national economic growth. They were also able to rely on the core principles of the UN, 
the equality of all  nations and the right to strive for this equality,  as well  as the social  
and developmental principle institutionalized through sustainable development. In addi-
tion to this, downright power politics and negotiation strategies were applied. Seen from 
the viewpoint of the Finnish NGOs, the negotiations happened somewhere else, as the 
records from a meeting held after the summit state that, during these negotiations 
Brazil had focused on big countries and groups; for example they did not negotiate with 
Finland … the G77 was internally fragmented and Brazil had the support of the USA on 
big issues (EDG 13.9.2012) 
The developing countries negotiate in regional groupings or in regards to central issues, 
in the “G77 plus China” group. The lack of coherence in the group and support from a 
major actor like United States partly made it possible for Brazil to take charge. In addi-
tion to the political  skill  displayed in Brazil’s actions,  they were also seen to represent 
the country’s new status: 
it was skillful diplomatic work, whether you agree on the contents or not, one can but 
admire the fact that Brazil got something out from there, it tells something about their 
position, because they did it so arrogantly, if it would have been any other country, it 
would have not gotten away with it (I4, Finnish NGO representative) 
The actions of the Brazilian government were seen to be two-fold: it did not correspond 
to conceptions of an accountable way of operating, but at the same time the complete 
failure of the summit, which had been planned for over two years, would have been 
equally devastating. In his analysis of Rio+20, Mark Halle of the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (IISD), summarized the events: 
“Clearly, there was no way to complete negotiations in time for Heads of State to flour-
ish the pen. So the Brazilians pulled a text from their back pockets and offered it on a 
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‘take it or leave it’ basis to the stunned delegates. Leaving it would have meant a huge, 
public failure and, for many countries, an affront to their Brazilian ally. Taking meant 
giving up aspirations, but not much in reality since the text is free of genuine commit-
ments. Accepting the text and declaring the conference a success was the easy way out, 
and the one taken.” (Halle 2012.) 
In the light of these analyses,  the compliments directed towards the host country were 
not just the usual frosting that is expected from ceremonial addresses. 
But the analysis of the Rio+20 outcomes should not focus only on the actions of a single 
country, even if it acted as the host of the summit and rather explicitly took charge of 
the negotiations. The countries have invested political credibility into the UN negotia-
tions, and complete failure was not an option in the minds of many. The problems of the 
two and a half years long negotiations represent a disconnection between the members 
of the UN, and the fact that the Northern countries can no longer act as “enlightened 
colonial lords” who tell others what is the “correct way to die in poverty” (as one audi-
ence member quite bluntly phrased it in his question to the panel, S6). The Finnish 
NGOs state in their reflections on the outcomes that from now on in international nego-
tiations the developing countries group have to be taken as seriously as the United 
States (Kepa 2012). Rio marks a dramatic shift in the place of the developing countries 
and this new role they now play is also very visible in the outcomes of Rio+20. 
In their analysis of “disenfranchisement” of developing countries and civil society, that 
is, depriving them of possibilities of both to participate and influence, Dana R. Fisher 
and Jessica F. Green (2004, 66) write that “developing countries and representatives of 
civil society still face obstacles that impede their participation in the multilateral arena”. 
Despite the legitimated legal status of both groups, they are disenfranchised from nego-
tiations through various methods. Looking at this situation from the point of view of the 
developing countries and of Rio+20, some reservations could be made. The developing 
countries should be analyzed in greater precision as they differ substantially in their 
means of influence. Also the overall place of developing countries could be re-
examined. This is not to state, that there would be no difference between countries in 
regards material well-being or other dimensions. 
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The new situations could be seen to have implications for the possibilities civil society 
has in influencing as well. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) have identi-
fied a pattern of influencing, in which NGOs or civil society actors in one country, una-
ble to influence their own government, bypass the domestic channels and seek interna-
tional allies to then influence their own countries officials. They call this the “boomer-
ang pattern of influencing” (pp. 12–13). This pattern can occur in the context of differ-
ent  political  problems  regarding  civil  society,  but  in  the  case  of  “less  powerful  third  
world actors, networks provide access, leverage, and information” (p. 12). The occur-
rence of this pattern is most obvious in civil right cases, which limits democratic partic-
ipation of citizens. But if the Northern countries, and especially the EU which has pro-
moted progressive environmental and human rights issues, are unable to exert power on 
these issues to the countries of the South as they previously were, some trajectories of 
the “boomerang” might be cut off. As many NGOs promoted development issues and 
the rights of the developing countries, also the fact that China, Brazil and India negoti-
ate as part of the G-77 was seen as hypocritical. 
Conclusions: poverty eradication and new relations 
The outcomes of Rio+20 strongly emphasize the social and development aspects. Pov-
erty eradication is seen as being the most crucial aspect the international community is 
facing today. The theme of green economy was closely associated with it, and will con-
tinue to do so in the future, if the results of Rio+20 are applied into concrete measures. 
Rio+20 could be seen as one mark in turn that is happening in international relations. 
“Getting things done will require more discussions to reach common understandings 
and cooperative arrangements that serve all, not just a few. The times are gone when the 
developed North under the leadership of the United States was able to more or less dic-
tate multilateral outcomes.” (Clémençon 2012, 334.) One can quite surely agree with 
this statement, but it must be added that the “common understanding” strived for and 
arrangements that “serve all” are not the ones established during the long-run develop-
ments connecting to the understanding about the embeddedness of states in the global 
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environment alone. The statement on the science and development magazine, 
SciDev.Net, concludes what was one of the most evident outcome of Rio+20: 
“What became clearer than ever at Rio was that the key to global sustainable develop-
ment does not lie in the logical arguments coming from proponents in the developed 
world, including its scientific communities, however passionately they are delivered.  
Rather, it now lies in the combination of political muscle and imaginative thinking in 
the developing world, particularly the so-called ‘emerging economies’ of countries such 
as Brazil, China and India.” (SciDev.Net June 29th 2012) 
If the international climate negotiations have not already taught the industrialized coun-
tries that they cannot continue on the old track, undoubtedly Rio+20 marks the turn in 
this acknowledgement. There are strong suggestions pointing towards a new set of rela-
tions, in which the “North”, and Finland as part of it, need think over their conceptions 
and strategies if they truly believe in their own claims about the acuteness of the prob-
lems related to sustainability. What once might have made the emergence of the world 
environmental regime possible (Meyer et al. 1997) is no longer enough to bind actors to 
its rationale. 
The outcomes give further precision to the “who”  and  “what”  questions,  and  a  more  
detailed picture can be grasped. Starting from the latter, the opposition to primarily 
green agendas needs to result in the rethinking of the action of those who represent the 
“Northern” side. Questions of how to address the question of growth and its relation to 
“green” values are crucial. But on the “who” side, the South in general should be taken 
seriously. Simultaneously, it should be acknowledged that it is not just the North versus 
South, as the emerging economies (most clearly Brazil, China and India) seem to have 
very different possibilities when compared to other non-industrialized countries. 
?
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??Conclusions?
This study set out to ask who were the Finnish civil society actors that participated in 
the UN Rio+20 summit and its preparations, what agendas did they promote and how 
did it all turn out. The findings can be seen to suggest both new developments as well as 
the continuation of old trends regarding these questions. 
Debates about sustainability are most of all debates about the future. In them, the cur-
rent  order  of  things  is  acknowledged  to  be  impossible  to  maintain,  and  therefore  new  
paradigms need be established. Looked from the ecological point of view, the environ-
ment is deteriorating and sets the imperative for change. This challenges the economic 
system that sets growth to its core. But the current way of life is not unsustainable only 
from the point of view of ecology. It is also unsustainable because of the prevailing in-
justice  between peoples,  most  clearly  present  in  the  unequal  distribution  of  wealth  be-
tween the countries of the North and the South. For this to change there needs to be de-
velopment. What would be the future we want? Is it based on limits or growth? This is 
the situation one finds herself when dealing with sustainable development, and this is 
also the rationale the Finnish NGOs tried get around by presenting alternative ways of 
reaching compromises. 
In my analysis I first looked at the group-formations and who aligned behind what 
agenda and cause. These agendas, claims and stands where then analyzed in two phases. 
I will first go through the findings that focused on the different groups and actors, and 
then turn to the latter two. 
The  participation  of  civil  society  in  the  official  UN process  operated  through the  nine  
major groups, established by the UN system. The Finnish NGO group, analyzed in this 
study, started to take shape during 2011 by (1) putting Rio+20 on the agenda of the 
common working group, (2) assigning representatives to the official preparatory com-
mittee coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and (3) organizing seminars and 
events which further discussed the Rio+20 agenda and set common agendas. All of 
these engaged civil society actors from the NGO group as well as other stakeholder 
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groups with each other and also with government officials. Overall, the NGO group, 
although formed by associations with large membership bases and legitimated statuses, 
operated through a smaller group of key actives (cf. Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 69-74). 
The Environment and development group, through which the NGOs cooperated, was a 
central arena for NGO stand formation. The stakeholder group established itself on pre-
vious connections and working methods, and in a way the preparatory process can be 
seen to have mobilized the network of Finnish NGOs already connected through previ-
ous campaigns. The organizations that occupied a central role in the political network 
were established associations focused on both environmental and developmental issues. 
Forming a common group to promote the agendas of Finnish NGOs operated quite ef-
fortlessly. Formally the input of the Finnish NGOs operated through the official prepar-
atory committee and through official consultations to which stands built on common 
grounds were entered to. 
In addition to these, the NGOs were active in promoting their claims and by organizing 
seminars and events were able to further engage with ministers, members of parliament 
and other officials in the negotiations. Although some differences prevailing, the coop-
eration between civil society actors and the state operated without major disagreements. 
Similar views on current environmental problems, the use of natural resources and on 
questioning economic growth gained support among both NGOs and government offi-
cials. The NGOs invested themselves on the combined agenda of limiting economic 
growth in the name of combating environmental problems. 
As the actors in Finland were able to agree on these issues, from the beginning discus-
sions on global environmental problems and economic growth (or development) were 
understood to be connected to the central divide between the countries from the global 
north  and  the  global  south.  The  North,  and  most  clearly  the  EU,  was  seen  to  pressure  
others to adopt more ambitious ecological goals which would have set boundaries to 
other actions, namely economic growth and development. The difference between the 
Finnish NGOs and government officials was that the first sought a solution through the 
compromise  between the  dimensions  of  ecology and  the  social,  and  the  latter  between 
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ecology and economy. The South was seen by the NGOs to promote growth-based poli-
cies that were geared towards achieving societal and economic development. 
This first section of analysis made it possible to point out the process of alignment in 
the groups and the construction of agendas that took place simultaneously. It made it 
possible to move further and to focus on the different claims, analyzing them through 
the orders of worth and the dynamics related to different conceptions of justified orders 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 2006 [1991]). The stands connected to different groups can be 
seen as in figure 2. The model of three dimensions belonging to sustainability has been 
established in the UN system, but different actors promoted these only partially (figure 
2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Conceptions of sustainable development between different groups and the associated or-
ders of worth 
Both the historical survey as well as the empirical analysis conducted in this study em-
phasized the connection between the agendas on global environment and its protection 
to development (see WCED 1987). Starting from this setting, all of the actors knew 
both sides had to be addressed, for a real solution to come out of Rio+20. Some of the 
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Finnish NGO representatives as well as government officials (coming from the Ministry 
of Environment, with the exception of for example parliament member Pertti Salolainen) 
promoted agendas built on the primacy of ecology and nature. The officials of the Finn-
ish government built their agenda primarily on green economy, understood as a growth-
based economic model that takes into account ecological limits (a compromise between 
the market and green worths). This model was supposed to provide economic growth in 
the form of green jobs and new green industries, which would then lead to development 
in the South. 
The  Finnish  NGOs  on  the  other  hand  built  their  agendas  on  the  compromise  between  
the dimensions of ecology (the green worth), and the social (civic justice worth). Start-
ing from the limits of the environment they formed a critique of economic growth, and 
tried to establish tests which would make possible the simultaneous achievement of 
both worths. Continuing from the planetary boundaries (Rockström 2009a), they at-
tempted to form a model that combines its threshold values to means of measuring soci-
etal development and an equal distribution of wealth. This attempt combined two estab-
lished agendas, the planetary boundaries as well as the rights-based approach (Kepa 
2011), and was presented most clearly through the so-called “doughnut model” (see 
Raworth  2012),  which  set  planetary  boundaries  as  the  outer  circle  and  social  limits  as  
the inner circle. The economy should be limited between these two sets of boundaries 
and therefore cannot be seen as unlimited growth. 
The compromise between the green worth and the market worth (e.g. green economy) 
would, in the thinking of those generally representing industrialized countries, bring 
about development as a result. The compromise of the two worth – green and market – 
was presented as leading to the third one, civic worth. The compromise between the 
green worth and the civic worth (the doughnut model) would on the other hand provide 
development for the South and secure the environment by denouncing the market worth. 
What both of these models do not take into account is that they include an emphasis on 
the ecological dimension too strong from the point of view of the South (both models); 
and that they do not promote economic growth as such (the view of the NGOs). 
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The analysis of the outcome document shows that both of these compromises were ef-
fectively rejected in the summit. The developing countries, led by the host of the sum-
mit, Brazil, established a resolution which can be most clearly described as a compro-
mise between the civic worth and the market worth. In other words, the resolutions sup-
port the equal status of nations through poverty eradication and the right to development 
and economic growth as means to achieve this (Figure 2). Ecological boundaries were 
rejected, because they work as a foundation for the critique of economic growth. With 
the same logic, green economy, even though including notions of growth, was rejected 
as  such  and  tied  to  the  overall  agenda  of  poverty  eradication.  All  of  this  was  seen  to  
reflect the new status of the so-called emerging economies, which displayed political 
leadership and skill, but also their legitimate status in international negotiations justified 
by  the  acknowledged  right  for  each  nation  to  pursue  growth.  The  test  for  different  or-
ders of worth which the summit and its preparations established proved the strength of 
the developing countries and compromise between the civic and market worlds. 
In this study I  have presented a diverse picture of the preparatory process and summit 
outcomes, grounding my analysis to multiple sources. Regardless of this, the data used 
of course has its limitations. By focusing on the records of the Environment and devel-
opment group and on the seminar observations I was able get a temporal and focused 
picture of the actions of specific Finnish NGOs engaged in the process. However, at the 
same time this rules out other possible actors who took part in the process or who are 
not included in the network of more established associations. This may rule out more 
radical views on the issues analyzed in this study, as they may have been sidelined al-
ready previous occasion, when not conforming to views present in arenas including both 
NGOs and  government  officials.  I  regard  this  to  be  a  topic  for  further  research  as  this  
study set out to analyze the debates between participating NGOs and government offi-
cials. 
Nevertheless, no unequivocal and established criteria exist for evaluating qualitative 
research (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2006, 133-135). My attempt has been to construct an anal-
ysis that is based on emphasizing points central to my research questions, and to present 
examples from the used materials, which support my own interpretations. This has been 
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made in a way which at the same time attempts to be critical to the sources while bring-
ing out the views presented by the actors studied (cf. Kuula 2006). This study has been 
exposed to critique and evaluation in the master’s thesis seminar of our research group 
in various phases which can be considered to further enhance its reliability (Tuomi & 
Sarajärvi 2006, 139). 
The results concerning the Rio+20 process also set questions for further research. Even 
though the UN system has been considered to be robust and lacking ways to adapt to 
new challenges, the preparatory process saw the rise of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which were proposed by two developing countries, Colombia and Gua-
temala. They are set address the same questions of poverty eradication and global envi-
ronmental problems as Rio+20 and give a new viewpoint to the constellation of states 
and non-governmental actors as well as the debate on sustainable development. The 
Millennium Development Goals were constructed on a non-participatory way and have 
not resulted in what they were set out to do (Nelson 2007). The emergence of the SDGs 
could be one point that Rio+20 will be remembered of if their formation is completed 
and if takes into account the outcomes of the summit. 
The issue of growth and its relation to the division between the north and the south 
would need further clarification. Increasing use of natural resources and its implications 
for the global ecosystem are perceived by equally increasing concern among many civil 
society actors as well  as those in the science world.  This study presented examples on 
how growth-based ideas are legitimized with justifications of equality, leading to the 
denouncing of the environmental dimension. Growth critique was not embraced in 
Rio+20 by any means and this sets further problems for those thinking that we do not 
have time for Rio+40. 
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Appendix?1:?List?of?abbreviations?
 
EDG    Environment and development group 
EU   European Union 
FANC   Finnish Association for Nature Conservation 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GSP  Secretary General’s High-level panel on Global Sustainability 
IISD   International Institute for Sustainable Development 
INGO   International non-governmental organization 
MDG   Millennium Development Goal 
NGDO  Non-governmental development organization 
NGO   Non-governmental organization 
SDG   Sustainable Development Goal 
UN   United Nations 
UNCSD  United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (”Rio+20”) 
UNCED  United Nations Conference on Human Environment and Development 
(“Earth Summit”) 
UNCHE  United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm 
Summit”) 
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
UNEP   United Nations Environmental Program 
UNEO  United Nations Environmental Organization 
WCED  World Commission on Environment and Development (“The Brundtland 
Commission”) 
WSSD  World Summit on Sustainable Development (“Johannesburg Summit”) 
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Appendix?2:?List?of?materials?used?
The seminars and presentations used in this study are referred to as S and the ordering 
number according to the following list: 
S1 Seminar 1 ”Naisten, tyttöjen ja tasa-arvon merkitys planeettamme tulevaisuudelle” 
19.3.2012, the Parliament of Finland, Helsinki. Organized by the Parliament of Finland. 
S2 Seminar 2 ”Rio+20: Aidosti kestävää kehitystä?” 21.3.2012, Eurooppasali, Helsinki. 
Organized by the Environment and development group. 
S3 Seminar  3 ”Info meeting for participants” 5.6.2012, Kepa, Helsinki. Organized by 
Kepa. 
S4 Seminar  4 ”Riossa ratkaisuihin – Kestävän kehityksen tulevaisuus”. 8.6.2012, Pik-
kuparlamentti, Helsinki. Organized by the The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 
S5 Seminar  5 ”Miksi Rio+20 on niin tärkeä?” 11.6.2012, Porthania, Helsinki. Orga-
nized by the Department of political and economic studies, University of Helsinki. 
S6 Seminar  6 ”Rio+20: mitä seuraavaksi?” 12.9.2012, Eurooppasali, Helsinki. Orga-
nized by the Environment and development group. 
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Appendix?3:?Question?form?used?in?the?interviews?
Background information 
1. Current position/role in the organization 
2. How has the organization taken part into the Rio preparatory process? 
a. The Environment and development group, the official committee, else? 
3. How did you end up / get involved into the preparations? 
4. Who have you cooperated with? How? 
Expectations about the summit and its outcomes 
1. What kind of expectations did you have? 
a. Did they come true? At least some? Which? 
2. What kind of chanced did the summit have in your mind? 
3. What is the status of Rio+20 in relation to other summit? 
a. What happens after Rio+20? 
Taking part in the preparations 
1. What kind of consultations, committees or other government forums did you 
take part in? 
a. What kind of chances to operate do these provide? 
b. Do you feel that it is possible to influence decision-making in these in-
stances? 
c. What do you think have been the central issues in this process? 
i. How well have they gotten room in the preparations? 
ii. How have they been discussed? 
d. Have there been other views in the preparations? What kind of? How has 
been promoting them? 
e. Have the points of view changed during the preparations? How? 
2. What kind of connections do you have with people making decisions regarding 
sustainable development? 
3. What do you think is the role of this kind of summit in regards to sustainable 
development on a local level? 
4. Why take part in this kind of preparatory process/ summit? 
a. How should Finland as a country take part? And how has it in your 
mind? 
Organizations own activity 
1. What kind of activity have you arranged yourself in regards to Rio+20 (e.g. sem-
inars, events, infos)? 
2. Who have you tried to reach with this? 
3. How else have you tried to influence the process? 
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4. Where do you get information on environmental problems, sustainable devel-
opment and other relevant issues? 
Themes of the summit 
1. Definitions for green economy (and related problems) 
a. What do you think about the concept? 
b. What should be in a green economy? Your view? What kind of other 
views are there? 
i. Definitions for the pillars/dimensions? 
c. Connecting the ecological, social and economic? 
d. Sustainable development? How does it relate to green economy? 
e. Democracy and accountability as part of SD/ green economy? 
f. What kind of norm or laws should be formed? Who should they apply to? 
Who should decide what they are? 
g. New indicators? 
h. What ways are there to make sense of green economy? 
i. Mainstreaming sustainable development 
j. Examples of green economy? 
i. Examples of what is not green economy? 
k. Water (as one theme of the summit)? 
l. Natural resources and green economy? 
Misc. (if they have not come up yet) 
1. The outcome document? 
2. Media attention? 
3. How to handle such a long list of agendas? 
4. The role of different seminars and events in the preparations? 
5. EU’s role in the preparations in Finland? 
6. Lack of political will, what is behind that? 
 
 
 
